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What is it to be the same person in the future as one is now (or was in the 
past)? Can a person be duplicated? Is personal identity what matters in survival? To 
answer these questions about the identity of a person over time or the appropriate 
criterion of such an identity, many puzzling thought experiments have been put 
forth by philosophers since the time of John Locke. Among recent writings on the 
issues, those of Bernard Williams, which argue for a physical theory, are notable for 
not only its ingenuity, but also its influence on subsequent discussions, including 
those by Derek Parfit. This thesis presents and evaluates Williams' theory of 
personal identity and some of the major criticisms against it, particularly those by 
Parfit. In the introduction I review some of the major ideas about personal identity 
in Western philosophy and survey the various theories regarding the concept. 
Chapters 1 and 2 describe and analyze the two central arguments in Williams' 
account, the Reduplication Argument and the Nonduplication Argument. With these 
two arguments, Williams contends that the continuity of the body constitutes the 
criterion of personal identity. Chapter 3 describes and discusses a different, 
psychological view proposed by Parfit. In the final chapter, through a comparison 
between Williams' and Parfit's views, I elaborate and discuss some problems with 
their accounts. In this chapter, I also scrutinize the relation between the concept of 
personal identity on the one hand and the first- and third-person perspectives on the 
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1. The Problem of Personal Identity 
Imagine the following cases: 
(a) Suppose suddenly, I remember nothing about myself, but only those that 
point to the life history of a particular person in the past. Am I identical to 
that past person? What if there is another present person who undergoes the 
same change and claims to be the very person that I think I am? Which one 
of us is that person? Is it possible that both of us are? 
(b) If the above situation is explained by saying that the two currently existing 
people simply know clairvoyantly about the events and actions that the past 
person experienced, what if they are both psychologically as well as 
physically continuous with the same person? Suppose my brain is divided 
and each half is put into a new body. As a result, there are two people who 
have my character and memories of my earlier life. We might then ask 
similar questions: Which one of the resulting people should be identified as 
me? Or are both of them me? 
(c) Suppose my brain or memory and yours are exchanged in an operation. Will 
I be you and you be me? 
(d) A similar operation is done in two steps: before your memory is implanted 
into my brain and mine into yours, our memories are extracted and kept in a 
device. Between the two steps, I lose my memory entirely. Am I，after the 
operation, the same person as the one who has full recollection of my past? 
These four cases, together with some others, will be discussed in the following 
critical examination of Bernard Williams' and Derek Parfifs theories of personal 
identity. The cases bring out two kinds of question that are the major concerns of 
this paper. First, there is the problem concerning the unity of consciousness: 'Can 
consciousness be divided, fragmented or shared?' or ‘What unites the different 
experiences of a single person at the same time?' Second, there are questions about 
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the criterion of personal identity: 'What is the criterion of identifying a person over 
time?，or 'What makes X at time tl one and the same person as Y at time t2?' 
Before attempting to answer these questions, we should clarify what 
'identity' means. There are two senses of 'sameness': 'numericaJ / quantitative 
identity' and 'qualitative identity'. In philosophy it is typical to use ‘identity, in the 
former sense. X is numerically identical to Y if and only if X and Y are one and the 
same thing. To say that two things are 'qualitatively identical，means that they are, 
despite being similar, two distinct individuals. That is, qualitative identity is a 
relation between distinct objects that possess exactly the same properties. Two 
objects may be qualitatively identical (or qualitatively similar to a high degree) 
without being numerically identical. Conversely, two objects at different times can 
be numerically identical but qualitatively different. Thus, I am qualitatively, but not 
quantitatively, identical to my twin. A plant is quantitatively identical to its later 
stages because of the physical continuity between the stages, whereas another plant 
veiy similar to it in appearance is only the (same，plant in the qualitative sense. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the distinction between these two senses of identity need 
not, or according to some^ should not, be taken as implying that there are two 
varieties. To say that I look like my brother means, that we share many properties in 
relation to our appearance. So, 'X and Y are exactly similar (or qualitatively 
identical)，means ‘X and Y share all their properties'. In other words, the properties 
of X and Y are numerically identical. 
Be there, in the logical sense, two varieties of identity or not, it is 
characteristic of most important philosophical discussions on personal identity to 
focus on the sameness of the person only in the numerical sense. A major position 
on the issue, for instance, is to hold that the continuity of the physical body (or the 
brain) is a necessary (or even sufficient) condition for numerically identifying two 
people, even though qualitatively very different, at different times as being the same. 
Williams, for example, thinks that mental properties, such as memory and character, 
1 See Colin McGinn, Logical Properties’ Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-3. 
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can be identical in a 'type-identity' sense but not 'token-identity' sense.� Therefore, 
a person (or better, a person's mind) cannot be ‘transferred, into another body, with 
the mind as the mark of identity, as what we might think would happen in cases of 
‘exchanging bodies'. On the contrary, some philosophers，such as Parfit, favor the 
continuity of memory and/or other psychological properties as the criterion of 
personal identity. Parfit claims that, given some suitable conditions, a future person 
who is psychologically continuous with me will be me, even though she may be 
qualitatively a very different person. ^  
Before embarking on a critical study of the views of Williams and Parfit, we 
will take a brief review at some precursors of contemporary theories of personal 
identity. This will be followed by a sketch of the major varieties of such theories. 
2. Personal Identity; A Review 
Tracing the history of the discussion of personal identity in Western 
philosophy will lead us back to some Non-Reductionist ideas in Plato's philosophy. 
According to Plato, I am a mind that happens to be associated with a body. I am 
‘chained，to my body until death unchains me from it. This strain of thought was 
prominent in the Christian doctrine about the immortality of human soul and the 
philosophy of Rene Descartes, the father of modem philosophy. Descartes believed 
that the self is the mind, i.e.，not that I have a mind，but I am a mind. As a 
separately existing entity, I，my mind (or self or soul) is self-subsistent and cannot 
be reduced to any particular facts. The real I exist in conjunction with a body and 
am causally related to its existence and activities. Unlike the body or other kinds of 
matter, the essence of which is extension, mind is thought, sensation and feeling, 
which is non-spatial Mind is a mental substance which is capable of disembodied 
existence and can go on after the body dies. Therefore, it is possible for me to exist 
without any body at all On such a view, and for that matter, the Christian view of 
immortality of soul，，personal identity is a matter of the identity of the mind or the 
2 This point will be discussed in Chapter 1 of this paper. The source is from Bernard Williams, 
"Personal Identity and Individuation" in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Pcqyers, 1956—1972, 
New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p.l8. 
3 This point will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper. It is found in various works by Parfit. The 
most significant one is Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, Part IE, 
Chapter 10. ‘ 
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soul. The body merely serves the means whereby we are able to identify other 
people. 
In John Locke's 'Of Identity and Diversity' the problem of personal identity 
is given its first clear ar t iculat ion. One of the motives of Locke's discussion is to 
provide an account of personal identity that would make sense of the Christian 
doctrine of human immortality. However, Locke rejects the standard solution of the 
Platonic-Cartesian doctrine because he does not agree to the Cartesian claim that 
‘that which thinks in us，is an immaterial substance. In putting forward his theory, 
Locke has three objectives in mind: 
(a) To make comprehensible the possibility of resurrection and immortality 
with a position neutral between the dualist^ and the materialist accounts of 
the self. 
(b) To give an account which is consistent with the fact that we do have 
knowledge of our own identities over time, which is not open to skeptical 
objection. 
(c) To make sense of the fact that personal identity is something that matters to 
us, that what we did or suffered and what we will do or will suffer cannot 
be a matter of indifference to u s . 
Despite being unsympathetic to the Cartesian notion of demonstrative knowledge, 
Locke implicitly accepts the Cartesian emphasis on the first-person viewpoint as 
providing a privileged standpoint from which proposals about the nature of the self 
can be judged. As a person is a thinking being, Locke argues, my identity reaches 
so far as my consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought. 
Therefore, my consciousness is my life. It constitutes, or determines, my identity. In 
other words’ my identity is a matter of sameness of my consciousness. I am sensible 
or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so concerned 
about myself as far as my consciousness extends backwards. In this way, my 
4 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New York: World Publishing, 1964, 
Book n, Chapter 27. 
5 According to Cartesian dualism, mind and body are two separate substances whereas the self 
happens to be associated with a particular body. 
61 am following Harold W. Ncx)nan's reading here. See Noonan, Personal Identity, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1989, Chapter 2, ‘Locke，. 
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concern about my own past and future is different from that I have about the well-
being of other people, because I cannot adopt towards other people a 'backward 
looking' attitude that typifies my relationship with what I think of as my own past. 
Thus, I may be indifferent to and uninterested in the identity of another person, but 
my own identity matters to me. 
Similar to Locke, David Hume does not accept the Cartesian account of 
personal identity. However, his view does not accord with Locke's either/ Hume 
points out that although it is true that I aware of various experiences of thinking, 
wondering, perceiving, and so on, I never encounter myself as the owner of these 
experiences. There is indeed no self over and above them. Thus, personal identity is 
a fiction. It is merely our imagination that leads us to ascribe an identity to distinct 
perceptions. Hume is not denying the self totally, but the self，he says, is simply a 
bundle of perceptions or experiences. From birth to death my experiences occur in 
temporal succession, and this entire series of experiences, in the succession of time-
slices, is what constitutes the bundle. Since no impression is constant and invariable, 
and the notion of an object existing through a period of time without change is a 
contradiction in terms, there can only be change but not identity in the bundle. 
Given this analysis, nothing, not even a self or a soul，can possess identity. Like a 
theatre where different actors/actresses come and go，a person is simply a locus 
where several perceptions successively make their appearance. Or，it is something 
like a thunderstorm, which consists of a sequence of different objects existing in 
succession: wind, lightning, thunder and rain. A thunderstorm is not a separate 
entity from them. However, is it really true for Hume to say that I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other and can never grasp my self} It seems, for 
many of us, that the self，to which my ever-changing thoughts, actions and feelings 
belong, is permanent, just as what Thomas Reid says in response to Hume, 
'Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and 
resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I 
am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers.'® Beyond temporal succession and 
7 For further details of Hume's theory of personal identity, see David Hume, Treatise of Human 
Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, ‘Of Personal Identity' and Appendix of Book IE. 
Thomas Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785，Essay III, Chapter 4. 
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memory there seems to be ownership. And this disposition of thought leads us back 
to the Non-Reductionist view again.^ 
3. Different Versions of the Theory of Personal Identity 
Non-Reductionism is the view that a person is a separately existing entity 
distinct from our brains and bodies 一 it is independent, indivisible and immaterial 
Personal identity is a further fact irreducible to particular physical or psychological 
ones. Such facts and the related events are owned by the self or the soul, who is the 
subject of experience. Descartes' theoiy of the immaterial spirit, as mentioned 
above, is a kind of Non-Reductionist Theory. Locke's Memory Theory and Hume's 
Bundle Theory of the Self, on the contrary, are reductionist. Accordingly, 
Reductionism can be further divided into two main groups: the Physical Theory and 
the Psychological Theory. 
3J Different Versions of the Physical Theory 
A central problem in the contemporary debate about personal identity is the 
problem of formulating a criterion of personal identity over time, i.e. giving an 
account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person at one time 
being the same as a person at another time. Different versions of the Physical 
Theory hold different claims about how such a criterion can be constructed in 
physical terms. Let's look at three popular versions. 
According to the first version, the Bodily Criterion of personal identity, a 
particular person PI at tl is the same person as P2 at t2 just in case P2 at t2 has the 
same body as PI at tl. Williams, a major supporter of the Bodily Criterion, thinks 
that the problem of personal identity is really the problem of bodily identity. 
Concerning its nature, he thinks that a person is essentially a material object The 
physical body, Williams claims, is a necessary condition for the identity of a person. 
This can be shown by the fact that in some far-fetched cases, one would identify 
9 John Hospers has given a simple but clear summary of the views of Plato, Descartes, Hume and 
Reid on personal identity. See John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, Chapter 6，Part 4，‘Personal Identity', pp.266-283. 
himself with his body and have his emotions revolving around the expectation of 
what would happen to his b o d y . Some philosophers, on the other hand, suggest 
that the Brain Criterion should be employed to replace the Bodily Criterion because 
the brain is the most important part of a person's body. So, in such a case as Sydney 
Shoemaker's Brownson Example, one may argue that Brownson, who has 
Robinson's body but Brown's brain, is identical to Brown because he has Brown's 
brain and is thus psychologically indistinguishable from Brown." Yet the Brain 
Criterion runs into difficulty when tested against the 'single hemisphere case'. The 
normal brain has two hemispheres that are connected by the corpus callosum. It has 
been discovered, not only that such a connection is not necessaiy for survival’ but 
also that people can survive with only one hemisphere. The 'single hemisphere 
case，is the possible one in which a patient who has suffered from a brain damage 
continues to survive with only half, or even less than half, of the brain. This clearly 
poses a problem for the Brain Criterion, for in such a case there will be personal 
identity without brain identity. Considerations of this kind，however, do not force us 
to abandon the idea of giving a criterion based on the identity of the persistence of 
any physical object Rather, we are led to the Physical Criterion!，, which suggests 
that P2 at t2 is the same person as PI at tl just in case enough of the brain of PI 
survives in P2. 
The Physical Theory has been criticized on various grounds. It is not the 
body that does any thinking, not even the brain; but it is T who think. It is surely 
tempting to say that I am something more than my body. And some people find it 
hard to believe that physical considerations are necessaiy conditions of personal 
identity for several reasons. First, they assert that we can conceive of disembodied 
persons. For instance, many of us have heard of those cases in which lucky patients 
experience a temporaiy ‘leave’ from their bodies and return. Second, the terms for 
10 I shall pick up this argument again in Chapter 2’ which is about Williams' Nonduplication 
Argument. 
“See Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1963, pp.23-24. 
I2 The discovery of the independent functioning and different roles of the two hemispheres has led to 
much intriguing philosophical issues. See, for example, Nagel's 'Brain Bisection and the Unity of 
Consciousness', in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
A version of this theory can be found in David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, 
Oxford: Basil BlackweU, 1967. 
4 These reasons can be found in Williams, 'Are Persons Bodies?' in Problems of the Self, pp.70-81. 
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or the concepts of a person and his body, for example, 'Jones' and 'Jones' body，， 
are not interchangeable. It is argued that 'Jones feels cold' and 'Jones' body feels 
cold' do not have the same truth-conditions. Third, if persons are purely material 
bodies，all properties of persons are material properties; but obviously this is not 
true. If it is true, persons cannot have psychological attributes. This is contraiy to 
common sense. Fourth, the identity of persons is not the same as the identity of 
bodies. This point may be supported by those cases about exchanging bodies, such 
as Shoemaker's Brownson Case. Such bodily exchange stories and Parfit's story of 
Teletransportation seem to suggest that the Physical Theory is to be replaced by the 
Memory Theory, as the brain is important only because of memory and other 
psychological connections, such as belief, desire and intention. Indeed, the line of 
thought that leads one from the Bodily Criterion to the Brain Criterion and then the 
Physical Criterion is motivated by the very idea that it is psychological continuity 
supported by the brain that makes it, rather than the liver or the kidney, the most 
relevantly important organ for our identity. 
S.2 Different Versions of the Memory Theory 
The versions of the Memory Theory include Lockean direct memory 
connection criterion, the continuity of memory criterion, the non-branching memory 
continuity criterion, and the psychological continuity and/or connectedness 
criterion. 
According to Locke's criterion, P2 at t2 is the same person as PI at tl just in 
case P2 can remember having some of the experience of PI. Yet it has been 
suggested that this criterion is too strong because the connection is a direct relation. 
For example, A1 may be psychologically continuous with A30, but not 
psychologically connected to him because A1 cannot stand in such relation to A30 
over such a vast 'distance'. If A30 is sufficiently remote, A30 may not remember 
having the experience of Al. That means that he may not have direct psychological 
relation with Al. 
Thus, it is suggested that the Lockean memory criterion should be replaced 
by the continuity of memory criterion. This criterion states that P2 at t2 is the same 
RS 
person 辟 PI at tl just in case between PI at tl and P2 at t2 there is continuity of 
memory (or psychological continuity), i.e., an overlapping chain of direct memories 
or psychological connections. A more sophisticated version is that P2 at t2 is the 
same person as PI at tl just in case PI and P2 are members in a series of 'stages' of 
a person (not necessarily in the order they occur in time): each member of the series 
either has a memory of an experience that is contained in the next person-stage, or 
else, has an experience of which the next person-stage has a memoiy. And for one 
to remember an event, (or action, or experience,) he or she must be the same person 
as someone who witnessed the event. He or she must 'really remember', (not just 
‘seem to remember，）the actual event.^ ^ In other words, a circular relation can be 
obtained between Pi 's experience and P2，s memory: 
Diagram 1 
Leaving the first-person 
the memory of the experience 
• 
• Pi 's experience, e.g.， P2's memory of 
of witnessing an event PI，s experience 
or taking an action. 
Tracing back to the experience -
the source of the memory 
In this way, the criterion is further refined in order to achieve a circularity by 
invoking the notion of causality: A remembers an event, e, just in case A seems to 
remember e and this memory-experience of A has an appropriate causal connection 
withe. 
Interestingly, Williams has used the above point to make a case against the 
sufficiency of the memory condition and to re-emphasize the necessity of the 
persistence of the physical body for personal identity. He argues that for one to have 
Many memory theorists agree upon the point that memory must be 'genuine memory'. See, for 
example, Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', 'm Problems of the Self. 
Q 
a genuine memory of a certain event, the event must in fact happened and that 
someone must be bodily present in that event. Otherwise, the only possible 
explanation to the memoiy is clairvoyance, a power to ‘look at，past events without 
having experienced them, which is not amount to genuine memory. ^ ^ 
Williams has another objection to the Memory Theory - his famous 
Reduplication Argument. Someone called Charles claimed himself to be Guy 
Fawkes (a historical figure of 17^ century): 
Not only do all Charles' memory-claims that can be checked fit the pattern 
of Fawkes’ life as known to historians, but others that cannot be checked are 
plausible, provide explanations of unexplained facts, and so on." 
Charles is psychologically continuous with Guy Fawkes, but, argues Williams, he is 
not Fawkes because what happens to him could also happen to someone else, says, 
Robert, at the same time. But Fawkes cannot be identical with both Charles and 
Robert. So neither is Fawkes. Identity is a one-to-one relation, but such relation is 
not guaranteed in the Memory Theory. One popular response is to revise the 
memory continuity criterion as the non-branching memory continuity criterion. 
According to this version, memory continuity is a sufficient condition of personal 
identity in so far as there is no branching of the continuous path of memory. But 
this criterion is objected by those who hold ‘the Principle of Intrinsicness，，or what 
David Wiggins has called 'the Only X and Y Principle'. ^^  According to this 
principle, whether any individuals X and Y are the same person do not depend on 
any fact extrinsic to X or Y. A possible position between Williams' argument and 
the non-branching theoiy is the ‘Best Candidate Theoiy', which states that the 
identity of PI and P2 only requires that there be no other person who is equally or 
in greater degree continuous with PI. Yet note the word ‘other，. How could one's 
identity or survival be logically dependent on the existence of an other person? So, 
This point is found in Williams, Ibid, pp.2-11. 
口層，pp.7-8. 
See David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance^ Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. 
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again, it is arguable that such a theory of 'other' is still incompatible with the 
Principle of Intrinsicness” 
The ideas of 'non-branching memory' and 'the best candidate' can also be 
found in Parfifs theory. The criterion that Parfit proposes is the psychological 
continuity and/or connectedness (psychological C&C) criterion. According to Parfit, 
a person's existence is not a further fact. Our existence involves just our brains, 
bodies and various interrelated physical and mental events. And our identity over 
time involves just psychological C&C in a non-branching form. In response to the 
objections to his non-branching theory, Parfit brings in some considerations about 
the problem of fission. He uses, for illustration, Wiggins' story of a split brain with 
each half put into a new body, which is a derivation from Shoemaker's Brownson 
Case. Parfit admits that in fission, identity is lost. However，someone who is about 
to undergo fission would not (if he is rational) regard his impending fission as death. 
He would also be irrational if he thinks that he could gain something by preventing 
one half of the brain from being transplanted and thus ensuring that there is 
someone identical with him in the future. He might rationally care about the future 
well-being of the several successors of fissioa Parfifs argument may be further 
explained in the following way. 
Personal identity is transitive. For example, if A = B andB = C, then A = C. 
But regarding psychological C&C, only psychological continuity is a transitive 
relation. There can be transitivity no matter how long an extension continuity is in. 
For instance, A is psychologically continuous with Z in this way: 










Psychological connectedness, on the other hand, is non-transitive. According to 
Parfit's definition, psychological connectedness requires the holding of direct 
psychological relations, such as that between a q-memory and the experience q-
remembered, that between a q-intention and the q-intended action, and that between 
different expressions of some lasting q-characteristic?^ Since these relations are not 
transitive, connectedness is not transitive, too. (Psychological continuity, in contrast, 
is transitive because it only requires overlapping chains of direct psychological 
relations.) The connections among Charles, Fawkes and Robert in Williams， 
Reduplication Case, for example, are non-transitive: Charles = Fawkes and Fawkes 
=Robert, but Charles 丰 Robert. Since psychological connectedness is non-transitive 
while identity requires transitivity, psychological connectedness, in fact, cannot be a 
condition of identity. Moreover, there may be many individuals, who are 
psychologically connected to A at the same time: 
Diasram 3 
A 
r + ~ ~ ~ -
i i 
B C .... Z 
Personal identity requires uniqueness. Yet in the relation presented above, there can 
be no identity as there is no uniqueness. Parfit, however, thinks that it does not 
20 The prefix ‘q-，is a device to deal with the problem of circularity and references to sections in 
Parfit's book. 
19S 
matter. What really matters in survival is not identity per se, but that there should 
exist, in the future, people who are psychologically continuous and / or connected 
with us. So in a case like Diagram 3 where I am splitting amoeba-like into several 
people, I should not be frightened as if I were dying. It is because to have someone 
psychologically connected to me is enough for my survival, even though there will 
not be identity. Parfit emphasizes the importance of connectedness to the extent that 
he thinks it is more important than continuity when survival is concerned. For 
example, as shown in Diagram 3, A is as close psychologically to Z as I am to my 
future self. Although A holds the same relations with many other candidates, all 
candidates inherit 100% of A，s memoiy. Yet in Diagram 2, A is as distant from Z 
as I am from my great-great-grandson. Though Z may have up to 99% of the 
previous ascendant's memory, he may have only a small scope of things common 
with A, (say, there may be less than 5% of A's memory remains in Z’s mind). A 
may not be directly related to Z as Z is so remote from him: 
g-memories will weaken with the passage of time, and then fade away. Q-
ambitions, once fulfilled, will be replaced by others. Q-characteristics will 
gradually change. In general, A stands in fewer and fewer direct 
psychological relations to an individual in his 'tree' the more remote that 
individual is. And if the individual is... sufficiently remote, there may be 
between the two no direct psychological relations, i 
Nevertheless, what matters in survival admits of degrees because 
psychological C&C is a matter of degree. The fact that psychological C&C may not 
be one-to-one or all-or-nothing implies that our identity is not always definite. In 
some cases, there is simply no answer to the question 'Will I continue to exist?' 
even though we know everything there is to know about what will happen. In fact, it 
is wrong to think that any future person must be either me or someone else. For 
Parfit，there is not always an answer to the philosophical question about personal 
identity. This justifies, Parfit thinks, a shift of emphasis from what personal identity 
consists in to its importance. 
Parfit, ‘Personal Identity', in John Perry (ed.). Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975，p.214. 
n 
4. Cases of Exchanging Bodies 
The imaginability of 'body exchange' has frequently been employed by 
memory theorists to make the case for their account. The forerunner of this 
approach is Locke, with his example of the prince and the cobbler story. 22 His 
example initiates a great deal of discussions and inspired many other interesting 
creations, such as Shoemaker's 'Brownson case’ and Anthony Quinton's 'the thin 
puritanical Scot and the fat apolaustic Pole，.23 Some even regard the subsequent 
writings of the topic as consisting merely of footnotes to Locke, just as all 
subsequent philosophy consists merely of footnotes to Plato. 24 Locke defines a 
person as a thinking intelligent being who has reflections. This definition shows that 
the mental nature of a person is emphasized to the point that it totally outweighs the 
material nature. It implies that there is no conceivable situation in which bodily 
identity would be necessary, while mental conditions are always both necessary and 
sufficient. It follows that in case of a bodily exchange between two people, such as 
a prince and a cobbler, it is unquestionable that the prince-body person is to be 
identified as the cobbler, and the cobbler-body person as the prince, with respect to 
their new memories. Williams contends that bodily consideration cannot be so 
easily divorced from other considerations. He uses a similar story to illustrate how 
difficult it is to individuate the persons in terms of memories and personal 
characteristics alone: 
Suppose a magician is hired to perform the old trick of making the emperor 
and the peasant become each other... The requirement is presumably that 
the emperor's body, with the peasant's personality, should be on the throne, 
and the peasant's body with the emperor's personality, in the comer... The 
voice presumably ought to count as a bodily function; yet how would the 
peasant's gruff blasphemies be uttered in the emperor's cultivated tones, or 
the emperor's witticisms in the peasant's growl? A similar point holds for 
the features; the emperor's body might include the sort of face that just 
See Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding. 
23 Quinton's view on personal identity can be found in his work. The Nature of Things, London: 
Routledge, 1973 and his paper The Soul', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.59, No. 15, 1962， 
pp.393-409; reprinted in John Perry (ed.). Personal Identity. 
从 See Harold W. Noonan, Persomlldentity, p.30. 
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could not express the peasant's morose suspiciousness, the peasant's face no 
expression of which could be taken for one of fastidious arrogance. These 
'could's are not just empirical - such expressions on these features might be 
unthinkable. 25 
This story shows that there are conceptual limitations for the identification, on the 
basis of memories or characters, of each of the people after the performance of the 
magic trick, such that the concept of bodily interchange cannot be taken for granted. 
The expression of one's psychological traits is too closely tied up with one's bodily 
features that sometimes we just do not know what counts as the expression of an old 
psychological traits when some bodily features have changed radically. 
Psychological traits bring out bodily features, and we can use the bodily features as 
hints to trace back at least parts of the psychological traits the other way round. The 
two aspects cannot be conceptually separated. (This idea of Williams is similar to 
the Constitution View^ ,^ though the claim of the latter is even stronger.) Since the 
possession of the psychological traits cannot be fully identified without reference to 
the bodily features, if the former are necessary, so are the latter. 
In fact, Williams says that there are also cases where the identity of the body 
is a necessary and sufficient condition and psychological considerations are both 
unnecessary and insufficient for personal identity. For example, if I am told that my 
memory is going to be extracted and then my body to be tortured, I will be scared of 
the coming physical pain. This seems to show that I will identify myself with my 
body even when my memoiy is lost or has entirely changed 
Concerning the cases of exchanging bodies, there are two different positions. 
One consists of the memory theorists who think that the people have acquired new 
bodies after the exchange. John Perry uses the following story to argue for this 
position. He asks us to imagine being the Senate who is going to support a bill that 
“Williams, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation', in Problems of the Self, pp.11-12. 
26 It is the view that self is the criterion of personal identity and that it is constituted. The constitution 
depends on the physical and/or psychological conditions 叫d the related events. See, for example, 
Robin L. Harwood, The Sruvival of the Self, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. See also Ronald G. 
Alexander, The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997. 
27 For further discussion on this example, see Chapter 2，Section 3. 
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will be voted on tomorrow. The bill faces bitter and unflagging opposition of the 
American Cobblers Association, led by the lobbyist, Peter Pressher: 
The morning of the committee vote you wake up，open your eyes... you go 
to the mirror. Staring out you see not your familiar clean-shaven face and 
squatty body, but the strapping frame and bearded countenance of Peter 
Pressher... Are you dreaming? Is this some kind of a trick? But you perform 
various tests to eliminate these possibilities... you turn toward your living 
room. There on the sofa sits a person who looks exactly like you... he says, 
'Surprised, Senator? I'll vote to kill that bill this afternoon, and it will be 
worth it...' He speaks with your own deep and resonant voice, but the 
syntax and the fanatic overtones are unmistakably those of... 'Peter 
Pressher!... ‘ 'Right, Senator, it's me. But as far as the rest of the world will 
ever know, it's really you. We snuck into your apartment last night and my 
brother Bimo, the brain surgeon, carefully removed your brain and put it in 
my body 一 or should I say your body. And vice-versa. It's a new operation 
he's pioneering; he calls it a "body-transplant. 
Perry tells us that if the stoiy is presented in this way, one would conclude that the 
Senate has acquired the lobbyist's body, and vice versa. Yet the events imagined 
may have been wrongly described. Perhaps the correct description is rather like this: 
One morning you wake up on the sofa, seeming to remember being Peter 
Pressher... A man emerges from a bedroom, who seems to remember being 
you. But subsequent tests 一 fingerprints, testimony of close friends, 
comparison of medical records, etc. - establishes, to your delight and his 
dismay, that you are a duly elected senator with delusions (which you keep 
quiet about) of having been a lobbyist, while he is a lobbyist with delusions 
of having been a senator. His situation is rather ironic. He willingly 
participated in a scheme where his brain (and so various of his 
psychological characteristics) were exchanged for your brain (and so various 
of your psychological characteristics). He seems to have thought that would 
^ John Perry, 'Problem of Personal Identity', in Perry (ed.) Personal Identity, pp.3-4. 
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somehow constitute a 'body transfer,' and he would wind up in the Senate". 
What actually happened, of course, is that two people underwent radical 
changes in character and personality, and acquired delusive memories, as a 
result of brain surgery. 
Perry has made an interesting and important observation: whether the appeal to 
imagined exchange of bodies makes a case for, or rather against, the memory theory 
depends on how the stoiy is presented. Locke, Shoemaker and Quinton would say 
that, in the above story, the Senator has acquired the lobbyist's body and not his 
psychological characteristics. Williams, on the contrary, would be in favor of the 
opposite conclusion that the Senator is always the one with a clean-shaven face and 
a squatty body on the sofa in the living room. It is only that he has acquired the 
delusion of being the lobbyist. Or，the Senator possesses a kind of mysterious 
power - clairvoyance"^ .^ Both views seem coherent, but one of them must be wrong, 
for they are contradictory. 
5. Conclusion 
'Exchanging bodies' is the starting point of Williams' arguments. With 
distinctive interpretations, Williams has put forward two arguments. In his 
Reduplication Argument, he derives a case from a case of 'exchanging bodies' 
where there are more than one possible candidate for identification if it is based on 
the memory criterion. Since personal identity is a one-to-one relation, there can be 
no identification in the Reduplication Case. And as it is logically possible to have 
more than one person who has the same memory, memory cannot be the criterion of 
personal identity. Another argument by Williams is what Perry has called the 
Nonduplication Argument.^ ^ In this argument, Williams derives another case from a 
case of 'exchanging bodies' where one may concentrate on the self-identification of 
one of the parties. People might think that the person at the far end of a 
psychological spectrum (where the psychological conditions are totally different) is 
29佩pp .5办 
30 This point can be found in Section 1 of Williams，‘Personal Identity and Individuation'. 
This is not a term by Williams himself. The term is found in Perry, ‘Book Review' (on Problems 
of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956—1972. Bernard Williams,) in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 73, No. 13, July 15, 1976. 
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not identical to the one at the near end. Yet the case shows that that person would 
identify himself with his body instead of his memory, as he would worry about 
what would happen to his body and have his emotions revolving around the 
expectation of it. Therefore, both derivations point to the conclusion that it is wrong 
to believe in 'exchanging bodies' and thus the memory criterion. 
In the remaining chapters, I shall discuss Williams' Reduplication Argument 
and Nonduplication Argument in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. The discussion is 
based mainly on the first half of Williams' book. Problems of the Self, in which he 
deals with various problems concerning the nature of person. In Chapter 3，I shall 
discuss an opposite view - Parfit，s view. Both Williams and Parfit are Reductionists, 
who believe that ‘a person，is not a further fact or a separate entity (or a soul), but 
consists in the existence of a brain and a body and the occurrence of a series of 
interrelated physical and mental events. Yet they hold different views concerning 
the bodily criterion and the psychological C&C criterion. Parfit claims that if one 
does not believe in Cartesian ego, one must admit that sometimes there is no answer 
to the identity question. In fact, identity does not really matter; only psychological 
C&C and survival do. My discussion on Parfit is based on several papers of him 
and his major work. Reasons and Persons, In the last chapter of this thesis, I shall 
compare the views of the two philosophers. Through this comparison, I hope to 
show that what we think of the criterion of personal identity is closely related to 
one's own perspective, and that it is worthwhile to discuss the nature of personal 
identity as such and attempt to answer the metaphysical question of what ‘a person' 
is. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE REDUPLICATION ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction 
Regarding the criterion of personal identity, some people think that the 
continuity of the physical body is not sufficient and need to be supplemented by 
mental considerations. This is the situation in our ordinary survival. Some thought 
experiments may even show that not only is the physical condition insufficient, but 
it is also unnecessary. Many memory theorists tend to start their discussions on 
personal identity with cases of 'exchanging bodies'. According to the memory 
theories, it is conceivable that, after a certain operation, two people, A and B, would 
end up with A-body-person having B-ish character and B-body-person having A-ish 
character. We would identify these two people with their memories and say that 
they have each obtained a new body, which is the other person's body, instead of 
identifying them with their bodies and say that they have each obtained a new set of 
memories. In this sense, the relation that can be obtained between a person at a 
given time (i.e., before the operation) and the same person at a different time (i.e., 
after the operation) is the continuity of his memory and other psychological 
considerations. Peny formulates this case as follow and calls it the Original Case� 
(where 't+n' indicates a point of time after time t): 
(Original Case) At+n (remembers Bt) Bt+n (remembers At) 
At Bt 
Similar to the case of 'exchanging bodies' is the case of 'reincarnation'. 
Imagine another case in which person A wakes up one day with the memory of a 
person in the past, B, while all his own memories are lost. Analogously, we would 
1 Perry, 'Book Reviews', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 73, No. 13, p.418. 
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identify the person as B and say that he has acquired B，s memory. This is Perry's 
formulation of the case of 'reincarnation'^: 
(Basic Case) At+n (memories ofBt; none of At) 
At Bt 
This case of 'reincarnation' seems to provide forceful evidence to the memory 
criterion of personal identity. Williams, however, does not think that it is an 
indisputable case to prove the theoiy. He imagines a logical extension of the case 
with another person, C, having the same experience as A :^ 
(First Variation) At+n (memories of Bt) Ct+n (memories of Bt) 
At Bt Ct 
The left side of the First Variation is identical to those of the first two cases. And 
the right side of it is also structurally identical with the left side. So, the previous 
identification (of At+n and Bt) commits us to identify both At+n and Ct+n as Bt. 
However, since it is absurd to identify both At+n and Ct+n as Bt, we must abandon 
the identification previously made, as guided by the memory criterion. This is 
Williams' Reduplication Argument. Memory theorists believe that the continuity of 
the memory and other psychological considerations are sufficient for the 
identification of a person as they seem to be in the cases of 'exchanging bodies' and 
'reincarnation', while the continuity of the physical body is unnecessary. Williams' 
argument casts doubt on such a belief. Williams' suggestion is that we take the 
continuity of the body as a necessary condition of personal identity. There cannot 
be personal identity without bodily identity. To Williams, the problem of personal 
identity is therefore just the problem of bodily identity. 
Williams' theoiy is presented in the collection，Problems of the Self. In the 
first half of the book, Williams deals with various problems concerning the nature 
of person. To him, persons are essentially material objects. He argues for this with 
i i m P.417. 
3 Perry formulates this case and calls it the First Variation, which is a derivation from the Basic Case 
Ibid, p.417. 
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his Reduplication Objection to the memory theories in three papers, chronologically, 
‘Personal Identity and Individuation' (1957)，'Bodily Continuity and Personal 
Identity，(1960) and ‘Are Persons Bodies?' (1970). In this chapter, I shall focus on 
these three papers and discuss the Reduplication Argument, the bodily criterion, and 
the objections to Williams' views as well as his responses to them. I shall start with 
a brief introduction to Shoemaker's Brownson Case，which is Williams' starting 
point of his discussion. Then I will elaborate Williams' Reduplication Argument 
and his bodily criterion. Following these are the objections to the Reduplication 
Argument and Williams' responses to them. 
2. Shoemaker's Brownson Case 
According to the stronger thesis of the memory theories, there is no 
conceivable situation in which the physical body is necessary for personal identity. 
Locke's view is an example. Unlike the stronger thesis, the weaker thesis of the 
memory theories holds that there is at least one case in which bodily identity fails, 
whereas mental conditions are sufficient for personal identity. Shoemaker's 
Brownson example is meant to be one such case: 
It is now possible to transplant certain organs... [i]t is at least conceivable,.. 
that a human body could continue to function normally if its brain were 
replaced by one taken from another human body... Two men, a Mr. Brown 
and a Mr. Robinson, had been operated on for brain tumors, and brain 
extractions had been performed on both of them. At the end of the 
operations, however, the assistant inadvertently put Brown's brain in 
Robinson's head, and Robinson's brain in Brown's head. One of these men 
immediately dies, but the other, the one with Robinson's head and Brown's 
brain, eventually regains consciousness. Let us call the latter ‘Brownson，… 
When asked his name he automatically replies (Brown，. He recognizes 
Brown's wife and family..., and is able to describe in detail events in 
Brown's life... of Robinson's life he evidences no knowledge at all/ 
4 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, pp.23-24. 
91 
The structure of this case is the same as the Basic Case (or the 'reincarnation' case) 
mentioned above. It is said that this example is the first brain transplant thought-
experiment in philosophical literature. It is supposed to show that the survivor is the 
memory donor, not the body donor, and thus that memory is the criterion of 
personal identity. 
(Some may doubt whether we can, in the brain transplant cases, conclude 
that the memory criterion is the correct one because besides the memory criterion, 
the brain criterion, which belongs to the Physical Theoiy, is also in the running. 
Nagel, for example, favors the brain criterion and says that even with its 
problematic conditions of identity in certain cases, the brain is still better than 
nothing. He also believes that the mind-and-body relation is very intimate and puts 
forth a theoiy called the dual aspect theory. He claims that ‘if a dual aspect theoiy 
is correct, then it is not possible for my mental life to go on in a different brain.，； In 
this sense, it is impossible to say that one's memory is extracted from a brain and 
put into another. Thus, the memory criterion can be in no way the correct one. I 
agree that the relation between mind and body (or brain) is a matter that has yet to 
be explored. I shall pick this up again in later chapters. Here let us first go ahead 
with the indication of the brain transplant experiments. After all, memory theorists 
hold that the brain is important only because of memory and other psychological 
connections. It is psychological continuity supported by the brain that makes it the 
most relevantly important organ for our identity.) 
3. The Reduplication Argument 
Williams does not think that the Brownson Case is good enough to support 
the memoiy theorist's thesis. He argues that mental considerations alone are 
insufficient and the physical body is always a necessary condition of personal 
identity. If his argument is sound, he will be able to refute the weaker thesis, and a 
fortiori the stronger thesis. As a first step, Williams presents a 'reincarnation' case 
that is structurally the same as Shoemaker's: 
5 See Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.45. 
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Suppose the man who underwent the radical change of character - let us call 
him Charles - claimed, when he woke up, to remember witnessing certain 
events and doing certain actions which earlier he did not claim to remember; 
and that under questioning he could not remember witnessing other events 
and doing other actions which earlier he did remember. Would this give us 
grounds for saying that he now was or had, in some particular sense, a 
different personality?^ 
He then introduces a particular man that Charles claimed to be: 
We may suppose that our enquiry has turned out in the most fevorable 
possible way, and that all the events he claims to have witnessed and all the 
actions he claims to have done point unanimously to the life-history of some 
one person in the past - for instance, Guy Fawkes. Not only do all Charles' 
memory-claims that can be checked fit the pattern of Fawkes' life as know 
to historians, but others that cannot be checked are plausible, provide 
explanations of unexplained facts, and so on. Are we to say that Charles is 
now Guy Fawkes, that Fawkes has come to life again in Charles' body, or 
some such thing?? 
Person A (Charles) at time t+n is continuous with Person B (Guy Favs^es) but not 
with Person A at time t. And from the mouth of Person A at time t+n, what we hear 
is the declaration of the identity of Person B at time t. So, just as Shoemaker thinks 
that the survivor is the memory donor, memory theorists would say that Charles' 
mental conditions are sufficient for us to identify him as Fawkes. 
In terms of content, there are memories of witnessing certain events and 
memories of doing certain actions. Williams agrees that actions and events do 
individuate a person. If Charles can remember all the events that he has not 
witnessed before, then it is necessary to say that he is identical with a witness of 
those events, who is the person he claims himself to be. By that very reason, in the 
present case, Charles' identity is shifted to Fawkes'. Actions, however, are different 
6 Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', in Problems of the Self, p.4. 
Ibid, pp.7-8. 
from events in the sense that they are not just to be witnessed but must be done by 
the agent himself. For each action, there is only one agent. Even for co-operative 
actions, we can still figure out one single agent by asking further particular 
questions, such as 'Who is responsible for that particular part of action?’ So if a 
person remembers doing such-and-such, then he must be the agent of the action. 
Moreover, how an action is done also gives clues about the character of the agent, 
providing another scope, besides his location, to help individuating the person 
(while an event only provides the location of the witness.) Therefore, if both the 
events and the actions that Charles claims to remember point to the same particular 
man — Fawkes, then it seems unreasonable to deny the identity between Charles and 
Fawkes. 
However, it is logically possible for two people to claim to be Fawkes at the 
same time. Thus, problems arise because the possible candidates psychologically 
continuous with Fawkes are reduplicated. What happens to Charles can also happen 
to another contemporary person, for example, Charles' brother, Robert, who 
undergoes the same sudden change simultaneously as Charles, acquires a character 
exactly like that of Fawkes and makes sincere memory claims that fit Fawkes' life. 





What should we say in this case then? Can both Charles and Robert be identical 
with Fawkes? Or should we say that only one of them is Fawkes? Let A be Charles, 
B be Fawkes and C be Robert: 
If the conditions were sufficient to say A = B, they would be sufficient to 
say that C = B as well. But it cannot be the case both that A = B and C = B, 
for，were it so, it would follow that A = C, which is absurd. One can avoid 
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this absurdity by abandoning one or both of the assertions A = B and C = B. 
But it would be vacuous to assert one of these and abandon the other, since 
there is nothing to choose between them; hence the rational course is to 
abandon both. 
Since both Charles and Robert are perfectly symmetrically related to Fawkes, it 
cannot be the case that either Charles = Fawkes and Robert * Fawkes, or Charles 丰 
Fawkes and Robert = Fawkes. We can make no decision even when we are pressed 
for one as we can follow no principle to determine which one to choose and give no 
reason in choosing one rather than the other. So we are left with only two options: 
either 
(a) Both Charles and Robert are Fawkes, or 
(b) Both are not. 
However, if, as mentioned in (a)，that Charles = Fawkes and Robert = Fawkes, then 
it must be true that, by the law of transitivity, Charles = Robert. Yet they cannot be 
one and the same person, otherwise, our concept of a person would have been 
distorted. We do not believe that they are identical with each other because they 
possess distinct loci of mental life and occupy different bodies at different spatial 
locations. In short, they cannot be at two places at once. Hence, the only possible 
answer is (b), that both Charles and Robert are not Fawkes. 
Williams demands a one-to-one relation for personal identity. However, the 
criterion that the memory theories propose is not one that can hold such relation, for 
the case above shows that the information transferred may be duplicated. Perhaps 
there are exceptions in each possible world as Shoemaker says, ^ and the 
reduplication case might be one of these exceptions. As for his Brownson Case, 
Shoemaker has another way to defend it against the Reduplication Objection. From 
Shoemaker's story we can derive this principle: ‘A and B are the same person if and 
only if B displays the same memoiy- and character-traits as A, and does so because 
8 Williams, ‘Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity', in Problems of the Self’ p. 19. 
9 This explanation is found in Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (op. cit.，p.4). 
the body of B contains the same brain as the body of A.，io In other words, the 
principle requires that the relation between Person A and Person B be a unique one: 
For let R be the relation of 'having memory- and character-resemblance to， 
(suitably strongly interpreted). 'Bearing R to A' cannot by itself provide the 
criterion of identity with A, since it is liable to the reduplication problem. 
But 'uniquely bearing R to A，can; since if B uniquely bears R to A, then 
something is true of it which is just not true of it if C bears R to A as well. ^  ^  
As it is impossible for another person's body, e.g., that of C, to contain the brain of 
A just as the body of Person B does at the same time, it is justified to say that B is 
identical with A (unless the brain is split into two, which reintroduces the 
reduplication problem.) With the principle. Shoemaker now seems to be able to deal 
with Williams' objection. 
However, the uniqueness Williams has in mind is not only a contingent 
matter. As Perry points out, '[he] probably thinks of a criterion of identity as a 
relation between persons that is logically sufficient for identity.' ^^  Williams 
criticizes that Shoemaker designs his principle of identity especially to avoid the 
reduplication problem, by suppressing the existence of a rival candidate, e.g., C. 
What Shoemaker says of the unique relation is only one possible case of one person 
'having memory- and character-resemblance to, another. He says nothing to make 
his principle cover all cases. Rather, his principle implies that there are cases where 
there are memory- and character-resemblance between people, but are liable to the 
reduplication problem (shall there be no uniqueness.) Since it is logically possible 
to have a rival candidate, C, (besides A，）to claim to be B, Shoemaker has simply 
pushed for a unique relation blindly, and overridden the possible reduplication cases 
or suppressed the possible rival candidate in such cases. Yet how can a non-
identification between A and B in a Reduplication Case turn to be identification just 
10 Williams points out that such a sophisticated version of the criterion is suggested by Wiggins in 
his Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity^ p.55. See Williams, 'Are Persons Bodies?' in Problems 
of the Self, p.78. • 
“This is an interpretation of Shoemaker's idea by Williams. Ibid, p.78. 
12 Perry, ‘Book Reviews', in Ihe Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 13, p.426. 
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because of the suppression of the rival candidate C? In fact, how can one's identity 
depend upon the existence of other people? 
In the Reduplication Case, the relation between At+n and Bt and that 
between Ct+n and Bt are not sufficient for identity since they are not a one-to-one 
relation, as we can see from the First Variation. Moreover，as noted earlier, the 
Basic Case is just half of the presentation of the First Variation. Therefore, our 
judgment concerning the relations regarding At and Bt in the two cases should be 
the same. If Charles is not identical with Fawkes in the Reduplication Case, neither 
is he in the Basic Case. It is coherent to claim that Charles alone is not Fawkes even 
in a possible world where no other candidate need to be considered In this way, the 
Reduplication Argument shows that memory is not a sufficient condition. of 
personal identity, both in the Reduplication Case and the ‘reincarnation，case. 
Certainly there is a strong temptation to say that Shoemaker's Brownson 
Case provides a counter-example to Williams' thesis, that personal identity is 
bodily identity, because it does seem absurd to say that Brownson, who has the 
brain of Brown and the body of Robinson, is identified as Robinson instead of the 
other. Yet Shoemaker's principle, Williams would think, is inadequate, since it fails 
to take into account of the fact that Shoemaker's case is still open to the logical 
possibility of the reduplication problem. In this way, Williams succeeds in 
undermining the thesis that mental considerations are sufficient for personal identity. 
Williams then proceeds to further argue for the necessity of the physical body. 
4. Memory Claims, Bodily Presence and Reincarnation 
From the conclusion of the Reduplication Argument, it can be seen that 
neither Charles nor Robert is identical with Fawkes. Yet how is it possible for 
Charles not to be Fawkes but to possess the 'same memory，as Fawkes? For 
Williams, the memories that fit Fawkes' life and that Charles now claims to 
remember are not real memories. He explains this with a discussion on the nature of 
memory. According to the story, Charles remembers certain events and actions that 
he did not claim to remember, while those that he did remember before he cannot 
remember now. And if Charles claims to remember all the actions and events which 
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point to a unique person, then we have good reasons to say that Charles is that 
particular person. However, there are two important features of memoiy that we 
should pay attention to. First, ‘to remember' is like 'to know'. To say that 'A 
remembers x，literally is to imply that x really happened; in this respect ‘remember， 
is parallel to ‘know’�� Moreover, 'It does not follow from this, nor is it true, that all 
claims to remember, any more than all claims to know, are veridical; or, not 
everything one seems to remember is something one really remembers.’丨4 Therefore, 
for A to remember himself witnessing or doing x, it is necessary that A was present 
when X happened or was done. T o really remember' is not the same as just 'to 
claim to remember' or ‘to seem to remember'. Otherwise, the memory is just 
apparent memory. 
To find out whether someone truly remembers witnessing a certain event or 
doing a certain action, we, therefore, need to find out whether he was bodily present 
at the event or who performed the action. This is our ordinary way of determining 
whether a memory claim is true. (This also indicates how the normal operation of 
the mental criterion involves the bodily one.) But this is obviously inapplicable to 
the case of Charles' memoiy claims. For by hypothesis, the body of Charles is not 
supposed to be present spatio-temporally in those events and actions. Hence, in this 
story, or other similar ones, what the person claims to remember cannot be real 
memory. And the change that happens to Charles is not sufficient to justify our 
saying that he has become Fawkes, though Charles is，in a sense, 'mentally' 
continuous with Fawkes. So, the reincamation-style stories, including Shoemaker's 
body exchange case, cannot be used to support the memory criterion. Rather they 
show, if anything, that the physical body is necessary for identity if memory is, 
since for one to really remember something he must have experienced it himself. 
Williams believes that the most possible explanation of Charles' condition is 
the hypothesis of clairvoyance (together with a loss of his real memories.) Charles 
simply reads Fawkes' mind clairvoyantly. He mysteriously witnesses the events in 
Fawkes，mind as if Fawkes witnessed them in reality. As to actions, things may not 
be as straightforward. It is generally true that there is only one agent for one action 
13 Williams, 'Personal Identity ajid Individuation', in Problems of the Self, p.3. 
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(barring collective actions if we count a collective action as a single one.) Thus, it 
seems impossible for two people, Fawkes and Charles, to remember doing a single 
action. Yet Williams explains that many features of actions, such as intentions of 
the agent, are just like events. For example, 'a pen falls down from my hand，may 
be an action that I do, if I intend to drop the pen. Or it may merely be an event that I 
witness, if I drop the pen carelessly. Some of the intentions may be inferred by the 
observers but others are private to the agent alone. This explanation of Williams, 
however, does not seem to be very satisfactory. If Charles is not identical with 
Fawkes but only reads his mind clairvoyantly, then all he knows can only be events 
and never be actions. If there is any one piece of Charles' memory that is real 
memory of an action by Fawkes, then it is enough to say that Charles is Fawkes. 
Therefore, Williams asserts that an action may be an event, in order to avoid the 
possibility of Charles being the agent of an action of Fawkes. Yet even if the 
observers do not know the intention, the person himself, (i.e., Charles,) does. If 
Charles has intended to do a certain action, he must have known that it was an 
action instead of an event. And it seems absurd if all he claims to have experienced 
are events and none is an action. 
Williams explains again that sometimes it is difficult to identify the agent 
with the description ‘the person who did the (token) action A，because there may be 
several people doing that action. Suppose each of them is at a certain time and place 
sharpening a pencil. In that case, the description ‘the man sharpening a pencil' fails 
to individuate the particular person that we are talking about. It is only when we 
have more details of the description that we can further individuate the unique agent. 
Besides, sometimes we need to identify the agent first in order to identify the action. 
Thus, it is useless to say that we can identify the agent through identifying the 
action. For example, if several men were all dancing in the same movements, we 
can identify the action only with regard to the person. The best description that we 
can make is perhaps something like ‘Josefs dancing'. ^ ^ However, it seems we have 
such problem only if we are the observers. As the observers, we may have the 
pictures of several men sharpening pencils and several men dancing in our mind, as 
if we were the audience watching a film. The person that we are talking about is one 
” These points refer to Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', Ibid, pp.6-7. 
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of these men and we need to pick him out from that crowd.�6 This might be a 
difficult task as the men are so similar in doing the same action. Yet for the agent 
himself, he would have a different picture. Suppose these descriptions are the 
claims that Charles makes: ‘I remember sharpening a pencil with several men at a 
certain time and place' and ‘I remember dancing with several men together，. He is 
amid these men and thus has a different perspective from an observer, with him as 
the center of his perspective. So he might locate his position as sitting next to or 
standing behind somebody. In this way, it seems he would have no difficulty in 
singling himself out. After all, as mentioned before, he does not need all those 
evidences in order to prove himself to be the agent. He will know if he experiences 
doing the action. The agent does not need the agreement and verification of the 
observers to claim that an action is done by him. Therefore, the hypothesis of 
clairvoyance Williams puts forward, I think, may have difficulties in applying to 
Charles' claims of remembering doing an action. (Perhaps, it would be better to 
regard them as Charles' delusion, as Perry says regarding the Senate.) 
Williams' Reduplication Argument shows that mental considerations can 
never be sufficient for personal identity. And he argues that memoiy claims without 
bodily presence (or at least evidence corporative of bodily presence) cannot be 
helpful in identifying a person. Despite the problems with the hypothesis of 
clairvoyance, it is clear that Williams has shown rather forcefully the importance of 
the physical body in personal identity. For him, personal identity is bodily identity. 
In fact, when we ask the question: (a) ‘Is he the same person as he used to be?，what 
we mean at first sight refers to the body. A better expression would be: (b) ‘Is this 
person the same as the person who went to sleep here last night?，If what we mean 
is the character of the person, it would be better for us to rephrase the question into: 
(c) 'Is he the same sort of person he used to be?，Or (d) 'Has he the same 
personality as he used to have?' These are not really identity questions, as they 
concern the type or personality of the person only. However，some people think that 
these questions can point to a particular person with his personal history as well, 
16 This implies that we have to make that person apparent to others, amid a range of particular people 
of the same type, (e.g., dancing people,) of which one we intend to speak, in order to identify him. 
This casts a difficulty because we cannot use the description 'dancing' to identify the person while 
all people in the hall share this property. For the concept of 'otherness', see Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, translated by Kathleen Blarney, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1992. 
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and put the question with different wordings: (e) 'Is the (particular) personality he 
has now the same as the one he had before?'^^ In this way, the question refers not 
only to the set of characteristics but the individual personality, with reference to the 
memory and the possession of a particular past. Williams has proved this to be an 
unduly question of personal identity with his Reduplication Objection. 
5. Objections to the Reduplication Argument 
5,1 The Two Cases are Different 
Some might object that there are differences between the case with Charles 
alone to be identical with Fawkes and the one with another candidate, Robert. The 
first reason is that we cannot guarantee the two cases as exactly the same if the 
numbers of candidates are different. Secondly, the standard question of identity is 
‘Is this X the same as that X which...?' This question can be applied to the case 
with a single candidate. For the case with Robert, it seems the question need to be 
changed into 'Are these two X，s the same (X?) as the X which... ?，！呂 And this is not 
a recognizable form of identity question. Therefore, with these two differences, the 
Reduplication Argument can only show that we cannot identify anyone with 
Fawkes if more than one person is psychologically continuous with him. When we 
are talking about one candidate only, we can still use the memoty criterion for 
identification. 
In response to this, Williams reminds us of the ambiguity of the word 
'same'. Strictly speaking, the word means 'absolutely the same' or ‘identical，，Yet 
in a loose sense, it means merely ‘exactly similar'. We can spot the difference by 
comparing the following statements about a certain person, Jones:^ ^ 
(a) He has his father's watch. 
(b) He wears the same watch as his father. 
(c) He has the same character as his father (or he has his father's character). 
Questions (a) to (e) are found in Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', Ibid, pp.2-3. 
These two questions are found in Williams, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation', Ibid, p.9. 
Regarding the second statement, it is ‘He wears the same clothes as his father' instead of 'He 
wears the same watch as his father' in the original text. See Williams, Ibid, p. 18. 
The meaning of the first statement is very clear, (a) means that Jones has the same 
piece of watch as his father. It obviously refers to a particular. But if we change the 
statement into (b), it can carry two different senses，seesawing over the line between 
particular and general. It may mean the same as statement (a), or that there are two 
watches of the same style, with one belonging to Jones and the other his father. In 
that case, when the word ‘same, is used to describe material objects, it becomes 
ambiguous. It may refer to the relation between two or more distinct objects that are 
physically alike. This is a relation of exact similarity. Alternatively, we can mean 
the numerical identity of one object at two different times and/or places. We need to 
clarify which sense we employ in different situations. Misunderstanding may occur 
if we mix the two senses up. So if we look back upon the question of personal 
identity regarding the physical body, XI is identical with X2 over time only when 
XI，s body is the same in the strict sense as X2，s. It is only in this second sense can 
we say that Xl 's body is spatio-temporally continuous with X2's. 
Unlike statement (b), statement (c) is not ambiguous. The sense of the word 
'same' here is 'exactly similar' instead of'identical', because Jones can never have 
the same piece of character of his father, but it is only that they belong to the same 
type. Williams says that for the statements about material objects, such as statement 
(a), if it is true: 
Then if the watch he has is going to be pawned tomorrow, his father's watch 
is going to be pawned; but it does not similarly follow from [(c)] that if his 
character is going to be ruined by the Army, his father's character is going 
to be ruined. This illustrates how little weight can be laid on the idea of 
Jones' character being a particular, and throws us back on the familiar point 
that to talk of Jones' character is a way of talking about what Jones is l i k e . 
Unlike its application to material objects, the word ‘same，can only mean 'exactly 
similar' when we talk about mental properties. Hence, again, concerning the 
question of personal identity, what we mean by 'having the same memoiy or 
20 历械 p. 18. 
character' in the usual sense is in fact 'having the exactly similar memory or 
character,. So the claim that ‘X is identical to Y，can never be supported by merely 
saying, ‘X is psychologically continuous with Y’. (In addition, there is the difficulty 
to say that a person has the same memory of another person for the memory to be 
real memory.) 
The above analysis suggests that the question of personal identity can only 
be discussed in terms of physical considerations. Its implication for the story about 
Charles is clear: It makes no difference whether the number of candidate, selected 
on the basis of memory, is one or two. In the Reduplication Case, neither Charles 
nor Robert can be identified as Fawkes because their memories and characters are 
only exactly similar to those of Fawkes. Similarly, in the Basic Case, although there 
are no rival candidates, it does not mean that Charles is to be identical with Fawkes, 
because his memory and character are also only exactly similar to those of Fawkes. 
All we can say is that Charles' claims fit Fawkes，life. The introduction of the 
Reduplication Argument only further reveals to us the deficiency of the memoiy 
criterion. Therefore, Williams concludes that to be identical must be identical 
physically: 
The only case in which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished, 
as we have just seen, is that of the body - ‘same body' and ‘exactly similar 
body' really do mark a difference. Thus I should claim that the omission of 
the body takes away all content from the idea of personal identity}^ 
5,2 A Counter-Example by Robert Coburn 
In the article ‘Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity，？ Robert Coburn 
criticizes Williams' Reduplication Argument. To recall that, the main point of the 
Reduplication Argument is that since it is vacuous to choose one of the two existing 
people and abandon the other (as there is nothing to choose between them), it is also 
vacuous to make the identification with Fawkes even if only Charles alone is 
22 This article is found in the journal. Analysis, Vol.20 (5), 1960, pp.117-120. 
involved. Cobum, however, contends that this argument can be applied to another 
case in which it gives unacceptable results. The case runs like this: 
...A man George who suddenly disappears... A moment later an individual 
begins to exist who is in all discernible respects exactly similar to George 
(say George*). 
Cobum argues that Williams' argument also applies to his case (as it is possible that 
there should exist another person besides George* who is similar to George), with 
the result that it would be vacuous to identify George* with George. But this, 
Cobum argues, is unacceptable for the following reasons. First, it is wrong to regard 
the identification as ‘vacuous，，since much would depend on it, such as moral issues 
concerning crime and punishment. Second, it is an identification that we should 
justifiably accept (but he does not explain why this is so). Since the Reduplication 
Argument is applicable here, Cobum finds it defective. 
Williams' rejoinder to the first criticism above is that Cobum has 
misunderstood his meaning of the word 'vacuous'. For Williams, ‘to be vacuous' 
does not mean ‘to have no consequence'. Williams agrees that there is moral 
consequence concerning the issue of personal identity. Instead of meaning 'to have 
no consequence', wiiat Williams means is indeed ‘to have no ground' or 
'groundless'. Since we can follow no principle to make the decision of which one to 
choose in the Reduplication Case, Williams says that it is groundless to claim that 
the relation between Charles and Fawkes (or Robert and Fawkes) is an identity. So 
for the case of George and George*，if there is identity between them, it is justified 
to assign punishment to George* as a consequence of the crime that George has 
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committed. Yet if there is reduplication (which is a case of exact similarity), then 
we should not make such an assignment. Moreover, different consequences come 
from different grounds. Between the judgment of identity and that of exact 
similarity, there must be different grounds, as the consequences of these two 
judgments are different. However: 
^ It is a presentation by Williams. See Williams, 'Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity', in 
Problems of the Self’ p. 19. The original description is m Analysis, Vol.20 (5)，p.l 18. 
On the thesis that similarily of character and of memory claims is a 
sufficient condition of personal identity, there would be no difference in the 
grounds of two judgments, that of identity and that of exact similarity, one 
of which does carry consequences not carried by the other. Hence that thesis 
is to be rejected.24 
In response to the second criticism, Williams states that Cobum's case is 
very similar to his, except that there is physical resemblance besides mental 
resemblance. So if identification is not justifiable in Williams' case, so is Cobum's. 
Since Williams' case does not fulfill the one-to-one relation that is required of 
identity, identification is not justifiable in this case. As Cobum's case faces the 
same problem, it is just as unjustifiable as Williams'. If Cobum wants to insist that 
his case is justifiable，he must prove that the relation between George and George* 
is a one-to-one relation. Yet he does not state clearly whether George* appears in 
the same place where George disappeared. Besides, Cobum says that George* 
appears a moment later after the disappearance of George, but he does not say how 
long the time interval is. If the location and the time interval of George's 
disappearance and George*，s appearance are not restricted, it is possible that the 
relation is a one-to-many relation. The relation can be described like this: (a) 
'...being in all respects similar to, and appearing somewhere at some time after the 
disappearance of, the individual...' This is very similar to the memory claims that: 
(b) '...being disposed to make sincere memory claims which exactly fit the life 
of...，which is only true of a relation holding between things of the same type. This 
is, logically, not adequate to constitute the criterion of identity. Therefore, 
description (a) might need to be rephrased as (c) ‘...being in all respects similar to, 
and appearing as the first subsequent occupant of the place vacated by the 
disappearance of the individual...'^ In this way, the spatio-temporal condition 
would be restricted to ‘the same place' and 'a short interval of time' so as to limit 
the number of person that may be involved and secure a one-to-one relation. 
However, with such a restriction on the number of person, the Reduplication 
Argument would become inapplicable. Thus, the case, so reconstructed, would not 
serve as a counter-example to Williams' argument. 
Williams, ‘Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity', Ibid, p.20. 
“Descriptions (a) to (c) are found in Williams, 'Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity', Ibid’ p.21. 
To conclude, Cobum's argument has fallen into a dilemma. On the one hand, 
in order to set a counter-example to Williams' argument, what is in Cobum's mind 
must be a case that allows duplicated candidates, with spatio-temporal conditions 
unrestricted. Yet if there may be more than one candidate, then a one-to-many 
relation is allowed and the logical requirement for identity is not satisfied. On the 
other hand, if Cobum is to be justified in claiming identification, the space and time 
of reappearance must be restricted so that only the (first subsequent occupant' 
would be relevant. But then the Reduplication Argument would not be applicable. 
So, Cobum's objection has failed to refute Williams' account 
5J A Too High Standard Set by the Reduplication Argument 
Another criticism to the Reduplication Argument is that the argument 
requires so much that no criterion is compatible with it For example, we can 
conceive of a man splitting amoeba-like into two simulacra of himself. According 
to the Reduplication Argument, the two resulting parts cannot both be identical with 
the original, since they are not identical with each other, and we have no reason to 
choose one rather than the other. As a result, no identification can be made. 
However, both parts are continuous with the original spatio-temporally. Hence, it 
seems Williams' Reduplication Argument has set a standard so high that even 
spatio-temporal continuity cannot fulfill the requirement to be a criterion of 
personal identity. After all, one may add, it is spatio-temporal continuity that 
Williams lays the weight for personal identity on. 
Presumably those who hold this objection believe that the resulting items 
after fission are identical with the original in terms of spatio-temporal continuity. 
Yet Williams emphasizes that the two resulting items need not be considered 
identical with the original, because strictly speaking, they are not spatio-temporal 
continuous with the original. This reason is that the fact of fission would interfere 
the normal application of the concept of continuity. Hence, cases of fission would 
not upset the principle of the Reduplication Argument, 
Besides saying that the case of fission does not threaten his position, 
Williams further argues that fission and reduplication are in fact two essentially 
different kinds of cases. Although we cannot identify the resulting items with the 
original in the case of fission, we can still answer the original identity question in a 
negative way, using spatio-temporal continuity as the criterion. Williams illustrates 
this point with a billiard ball as an example: 
In trying to answer the question whether a certain billiard ball now in my 
hand is the billiard ball that was at a certain position at the start of the 
game — is to engage in a certain sort of historical enquiry. The identity-
question contains two expressions each of which picks out an object of a 
certain type under a description containing, in each case, a different time-
reference; to answer the question is to chart an historical course which starts 
from the situation given by one of the descriptions, in order to see whether 
this course does or does not lead to the situation given by the other. This 
procedure, ideally carried out, will give the entire history in question; and in 
particular, if there were any reduplication of the kind under discussion, it 
would inevitably reveal it.^^ 
The important point here is that, in case of fission, the spatio-temporal continuity 
criterion and the Reduplication Argument can actually supplement each other in our 
search for an answer to the identity question. To see if Item A is identical with Item 
B, we employ spatio-temporal continuity as the criterion and chart the historical 
course starting from one of them. If a point of reduplication is traced, we can 
answer that A is not identical with B. In Williams' case, the point of reduplication is 
not revealed in this way. We cannot say that there is identity before the point of 
reduplication and that there is none after the point, as we can find no such point. We 
do not even know if there are or are not other candidates who, apart from Charles 
and Robert, suddenly wake up with Fawkes，memory, and thus to whom the 
criterion is applicable. What we can do is to abandon identification totally. Thus， 
spatio-temporal continuity is simply not operative in this case. So, it is not a result 
妨!bid, P.24, 
of the Reduplication Argument that this kind of continuity cannot in general be used 
as a criterion of identification. 
From Williams' response we can see that the problem of the psychological 
criterion that Williams has in mind is not only that it fails to tackle the branching 
problem, but also that one cannot even use it to reveal duplication and give a 
negative answer to the identity question in the same way as we can with the 
physical criterion. He seems to think that a criterion must be practically usable. This 
is a major reason why he favors the bodily criterion. But practical usability or 
applicability in this sense is relative: a criterion usable for man need not be so for 
God or a superior being. First, it seems what Williams means is a criterion usable 
for normal human beings only because only in such cases do we need to distinguish 
between the physical and the psychological criteria in terms of usability. God must 
be able to know if there is another candidate sharing the same set of memory and 
psychological conditions. But in fact, if Williams is talking about the criterion for 
man, there is no need for him to give such a detailed discussion of how one cannot 
use the psychological continuity for identification as many folk theories have 
implied human limitations already. Williams should not focus on the 
epistemological question, but should approach the problem of personal identity at a 
metaphysical level. There is a sense of epistemological constraint in Williams' 
theoiy just because the usability problem of the criterion brings in the epistemic 
considerations, concerning whether we can tell who a person is. However, if what 
Williams aims at is personal identity as a metaphysical truth, he had better omit the 
human constraint. From the metaphysical level, both physical and psychological 
continuities are usable and qualified to be the criteria of personal identity. If there is 
indeed no big difference between the two criteria regarding their application, then 
Williams has yet to explain how his criterion is more superior than the other. 
6. Conclusion 
With his Reduplication Argument, Williams has made a forceful objection 
to the memoiy theories. The argument shows how memory and other psychological 
considerations fail to be sufficient conditions of personal identity. Instead, the 
requirement of real memory brings out the fact that the continuity of the physical 
body is a necessary as well as sufficient condition of personal identity. By that very 
reason, Williams claims that the problem of personal identity is a problem of bodily 
identity. Some people might have doubts about this claim because, says, loving a 
person is not equivalent to loving the body of the person. However, each body 
represents a token-person. It is a place where the token-person 'anchors'. Williams 
points out that memory and character, on the contrary, can print off many type-
persons by extracting information from a person's brain，for instance, Maiy Smith's 
brain，and duplicating it into many copies，and then putting the duplications into the 
new brains of many new bodies. If someone loves a token-person just as a Mary 
Smith, what he loves is only the type-persoa It seems then that loving a person is 
like loving a work of art in some reproducible medium. If I cannot get a particular 
piece, I would get another piece of the same type rather than get none at all. For this, 
Williams concludes: 
Much of what we call loving a person would begin to crack under this, and 
reflection on it may encourage us not to undervalue the deeply body-based 
situation we actually have. While in the present situation of things to love a 
person is not exactly the same as to love a body, perhaps to say that they are 
basically the same is more grotesquely misleading than it is a deep 
metaphysical error; and if it does not sound very high-minded, the 
alternatives that so briskly grow out of suspending the present situation do 
not sound too spiritual, either. 
27 Williams, 'Are Persons Bodies?’ in Problems of the Self, p.81. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NONDUPLICATION ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we discussed Williams' enormously influential 
Reduplication Argument against psychological criteria. In the argument it is shown 
that the structures of the Basic Case and the First Variation are the same, only that 
the latter is a logical extension of the former. Yet in the First Variation, it cannot be 
the case that both A = B and C = B because it would follow necessarily that A = C, 
which is absurd Moreover, we cannot choose one of the assertions and abandon the 
other, for we have no rational ground to make the choice. Hence, the only choice 
remained is to abandon both. That means we cannot identify A with B, which is a 
conclusion contrary to the Basic Case, thus to the claim of the memory theorists. 
A major implication of the Reduplication Argument - that personal identity 
requires persistence 一 is further explored and defended by Williams in his paper 
‘The Self and the Future', where an ingenious variation on the 'reduplication' 
theme is developed to try to give cogency to the idea of persons as material objects. 
This time Williams does not put a third person, C, in the picture as in the 
Reduplication Argument Rather, he tries to show us coherently his idea of the 
problem of ‘exchanging bodies' by focusing on one of the parties，A. Thus, 
following Perry, we shall call this argument the 'Nonduplication Argument'\ Once 
again, Williams starts with a story that would commonly be regarded as 
'exchanging bodies'. The stoiy, like Locke's 'the prince and the cobbler' and 
Shoemaker's Brownson Case has the structure of two superimposed Basic Cases. 
What Williams does is not to extend the story but to bring us to see the story from 
another perspective, i.e., the perspective of A. In other words, his second story is 
1 The term 'Nonduplication Argument' is found in Perry, ‘Book Review', in The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol.73, No. 13. Perry uses this term to refer to Williams' argument in his paper ‘The 
Self and the Future'. This is not a term by Williams himself. 
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very much a reinterpretation of the original one. The two cases involved may be 
represented as follows ^； 
(Original Case) At+n (remembers Bt) Bt+n (remembers At) 
At Bt 
(Second Variation) At+n (memories of Bt) 
At 
By re-examining the left-side of the Original Case (i.e., the Second Variation) from 
the perspective of A，Williams calls into question the idea of 'exchanging bodies' as 
represented by the Original Case and thus the memory criterion of personal identity. 
Williams also argues in the paper that the Best Candidate Theory, which is a 
possible position reconciling Williams' theory and the Non-Branching Memory 
Theoiy, fails to provide a solution to the problem of personal identity. 
In this chapter, I shall present a memory theorist's understanding of 
'exchanging bodies' in Part 2 and Williams' response to it in Part 3. Then in Parts 4, 
5 and 6,1 shall comment on three points that Williams discussed in relation to the 
argument respectively. The first two points are about the nature of personal identity 
and the last one is about the use of the criteria and the perspectives. I shall then 
conclude with an explanation of the common misunderstanding of ‘exchanging 
bodies'. 
2. Story 1; The Memory Theorist�Understanding of ‘Exchanging Bodies， 
Consider the following experiment on Person A and Person B: Both A and 
B enter a machine, and then exit with A having B-ish character and B having A-ish 
character. Such an experiment requires two pre-conditions. First，A and B are not 
extremely unlike from each other physically (e.g. sexually) and psychologically. 
Otherwise, there will be great difficulties in reading B，s dispositions in possible 
performances of A，s body, and vice versa. Second, since memoiy is a causal notion 
2 / 树 P.418. 
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linking the experiences and knowledge within the same body, we also need to 
suppose the transposition of the brains of A and B, or at least the extraction of 
information from the brains into a device and then its replacement into each other's 
brain. Such replacement of information should not be regarded as new input that the 
person learns again from the very beginning. 
Many people would say that this is a case of exchanging bodies, and that the 
memory, instead of the physical body, is what holds one's identity over time. This 
view can be supported by an analysis of the choices that the two persons make for 
their future. Suppose they are told that after the experiment, one of them will be 
given $100,000, while the other will be tortured; and they are to choose from these 
two options. Suppose also that they are to choose on selfish grounds, i.e., to choose 
to be awarded and leave the torture to the other. 
Several possible choices and related outcomes are conceivable. The first 
possible situation is that both A and B make a wise choice: A chooses to have the 
pleasant treatment for B-body-person and the torture on the A-body-person, while B 
chooses the opposite. The wishes of the two persons cannot be satisfied at the same 
time since they are conflicting. Therefore, the experimenter can only fulfill the wish 
of one of them. For example, he may announce that B-body-person will be tortured. 
A will then protest that that is not the outcome he chose; but B will welcome such a 
decision. In fact, they do know that they cannot both get what they want. If the 
experimenter conducts the experiment without telling them his decision, B-body-
person will complain, after the experiment, about the unpleasant treatment on him 
as well as his choice being neglected. He will say that he did not choose to have the 
unpleasant treatment on him. On the other hand, A-body-person will be happy and 
feel lucky that he was not tortured. Besides, he will also be happy about the 
fulfillment of his wish: getting $100,000 and not being tortured. In this situation, 
both of them have made a wise choice. It is only that B is lucky to get what he 
wanted while A is not. Hence, to care about what will happen on a person in the 
future is not the same as what will happen on the body. 
In the second situation, both A and B make an unwise choice: A chooses to 
have the unpleasant treatment for B-body-person and the pleasant treatment for A-
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body-person, while B chooses otherwise. Again, the experimenter cannot conduct 
an experiment that satisfies both A's and B's wishes. Before conducting the 
experiment, he may announce that B-body-person will be tortured. Both A and B 
know that they cannot both get what they wanted. At this stage, A is happy to hear 
the announcement. However, after the experiment, if asked for their comments, B-
body-person will say that he was happy before the experiment, but now he regrets 
very much on what he has chosen. He will say that he gets what he has chosen but 
that was not what he wanted, as the torture is now imposed on him. On the contrary, 
A-body-person will say that he gets what he wanted but in fact, that is not what he 
has chosen. Anyhow, both of them agree that the operation of the experiment is 
what A has chosen originally and that there is no foul play on the part of the 
experimenter. 
The third situation is that one of them chooses wisely, while the other makes 
an unwise choice. For example, A chooses the unpleasant treatment for A-body-
person and the pleasant treatment for B-body-person, while B makes exactly the 
same choice. This time, the experimenter is happy to find that he can satisfy both A 
and B. Both of them express that they are happy to getting what they want. 
However, after the experiment, only B-body-person tells the experimenter that he 
likes what he has received and congratulates himself for making the right choice. A-
body-person, on the contrary, expresses that he does not think so and acknowledges 
that his choice is unwise. 
Having considered these three situations, one may conclude that one must 
acknowledge the new body after such an experiment. Some people further contend 
that it is impossible to dump your old psychological conditions and attain some new 
ones by means of the experiment, because one's identity always sticks to his 
psychological conditions. One is to identify oneself with one's psychological 
conditions, i.e., one's memories, character and so forth. For example, both A and B 
may have some psychological problems lhat they want to get rid of, and hope to get 
rid of them by means of the experiment, based on the belief that bodily continuity is 
a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity. However, when the 
experimenter asks A-body-person about A's problem after the experiment, A-body-
person may reply that he does not know what the experimenter is talking about. He 
will complain that the experiment could in no way help him, because he still has his 
problem, which is B's problem. B-body-person will give similar response. To 
conclude, memory and other psychological conditions are sufficient for 
identification. 
3. Story 2; Williams* Analysis of the Experiment 
The above consideration concerning 'exchanging bodies' therefore seems to 
show that bodily continuity is not necessary for personal identity. However, 
Williams argues that the so-called stories of 'exchanging bodies' can be given a 
different reading which gives results contraiy to the memory theorist's claim. 
Williams invites us to revisit the above story with our attention fixed on one of the 
protagonists. Suppose I am A, one of the two people in the experiment. Suppose 
also that I am informed that I will be tortured after what is described in each of the 
following cases〗： 
(i) I am subjected to an operation which produces total amnesia. 
• The experimenter tells me that I will be able to disregard the fear 
because I will not remember what I am told now. Indeed, I will not 
remember anything I am now in a position to remember. So, there is 
no reason for me to be frightened now. Yet, Williams thinks, I 
understand that I will still be in great pain despite losing my memory. 
'Not to know that I will be tortured' does not imply ‘not to be 
tortured'. So as long as I know a torture is coming, I am still in fear. 
Moreover, the prospect of memory loss seems to provide further 
grounds for fear. 
(ii) Amnesia is produced in me, and other interference leads to certain 
changes in my character. 
• The addition of character change would not save me from the fear, 
since character change is not unusual in our ordinary existence. A 
person may have his character change to a degree that, after a period 
3 See Williams, 'The Self and the Future', in Problems of the Self, pp.51-52 and pp.55-57. 
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of time, he seems to be a totally different person, and the change is 
not due to any extraordinary causes. 
(iii) Changes in my character are produced, and at the same time certain 
illusory ‘memory，beliefs are induced in me; these are of a quite 
fictitious kind and do not fit the life of any actual person. 
• Having a different impression of my past when I am tortured would 
not make me feel better now. I can conceive myself going mad and 
thinking that I am someone else; and being told that this is going to 
happen to me would not reduce my horror of being told that I am 
going to be tortured. In fact, I would feel worse because besides 
memory loss, I will also suffer from having false beliefs. What I am 
told would simply augment my horror. 
(iv) The same as (iii)，except that both the character traits and the ‘memory, 
impressions are designed to be appropriate to another actual person, B. 
• The introduction of B cannot produce any material difference from 
(iii), because the addition is only an external fact. B's previous 
absence is not a causal condition for my fear. Torture is expected to 
be imposed on me, preceded by mental derangements. It merely 
gives me one more reason to be scared. 
(v) The same as (iv), except that the result is produced by putting the 
information into me from the brain of B，by a method which leaves B the 
same as he was before. 
• Again, the move from (iv) to (v) makes no difference for me. I can 
still expect the pain that I 細 going to suffer and I rightly anticipate 
it with horror. In Williams' word，it is only a 'trimming' how the 
change is induced*. After all, there is an undisputable presence of a 
person, B, so it is still me who is going to bear the torture. 
Ubid, p.57. 
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The above story shows that no matter what I am told about my 
psychological change, fear would still be my proper reaction to the torture that will 
happen to the body, because 'in one vital respect at least one did know what was 
going to happen - torture, which one can indeed expect to happen to oneself, and to 
be preceded by certain mental derangements as well.，。And the reason behind my 
fear is that: ‘...What impressions I have about the past will not have any effect on 
whether I undergo the pain or not.'^ One's fear can extend to future pain whatever 
psychological changes precede it. Williams then argues that if I can identify myself 
with the same old body instead of the new psychological state or impression in the 
present story (Story 2), one should make a similar identification in the previous 
story (Story 1), too, because Story 2 is merely one 'half of Story 1 (and become the 
whole of Story 1 with a different representation when one gets to (vi), see below.) 
There should not be anything different concerning the identity of A in the two 
stories. The identification of B can also be done in a similar way. Yet it is strange 
that although the Second Variation is derived from the Original Case, and that Story 
2 is part of Story 1，one can choose cheerfully among options in Story 1 but has 
perfectly hateful prospect in the other story. There must be some confusion about 
the idea of 'exchanging bodies' in Story 1, or so Williams argues. 
Some people, like the memory theorists, who favor the idea of 'exchanging 
bodies' may argue that Story 2 is a misleading representation. First, the 
experimenter persistently says that the torture will be on me: 'You' is the word that 
he keeps using when talking to me. Williams replies that the magic is not on the 
word ‘you，，but that I can really follow the steps of the prediction. And behind my 
fears lies the principle that my undergoing physical pain is not excluded by any 
changes of my psychological states. It is just like the case of unconsciousness. For 
example, in a car accident, I might be badly hurt and fall into an unconscious state. 
But having no idea about what is going on in my body does not mean that I am 
physically all right then. Second, some may argue that I should not be afraid of, say, 
standing on top of a steep mountain, if I do not have acrophobia anymore. Or, I 
should not look forward to meeting a person of whom I have no memories anymore. 
These cases are supposed to show that our fear and expectation of something 
” b i d P . 5 2 . 
”bid, P.53. 
46 
depend a great deal on our normal reaction to and memory of it. Analogously, it 
would be a waste of time for me to be afraid so much of the torture now, because 
the future character with that new set of impression may not find the torture so evil. 
However，physical pain is not as complicated as acrophobia and anticipation, which 
depend on factors of belief or character that might be modified by psychological 
changes, Williams replies, and I think rightly, that physical pain is minimally 
dependent on these factors. It is evil to everyone, whatever his / her belief and 
character are. 
Williams uses the Nonduplication Argument to reject the case of 
'exchanging bodies'. Yet Perry thinks that Williams' argument is, when applying to 
such a case, dubious. In the Second Variation, B is left out. There are three possible 
relations between At and At+n: 
(a) Identity. The change involved is only a psychological one concerning A. 
At's fears appropriately extend to At+n. 
(b) Death of A. 
(c) Something else. 
For Williams, situation (a) is the correct relation, because At+n must still be At 
instead of Bt, for the Nonduplication Argument to work. So, A undergoes only a 
complete amnesia. However, Perry contends that 'amnesia' is a slippery word about 
dispositions. It means the extraction of information, leaving the brain with memory 
dispositions intact or untouched. Yet the notion 'having a new set of impression' in 
the story of 'exchanging bodies' does not include such dispositions. So Williams' 
case is not a clear-cut counter-example to the case of 'exchanging bodies' and thus 
cannot be used to reject the memory theory. Finding that ‘amnesia，is not a suitable 
notion. Perry suggests that another term - 'brain zap，- should be used in discussing 
the case. To have a brain zap with another person is to have the information 
extracted totally from a brain and then replace it with the information extracted 
from another brain. This amounts to a total destruction of the original information， 
including the dispositions. If a brain zap were performed on A, according to Perry, 
7 See Perry, 'Book Reviews', in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 73, No. 13’ pp.421-424. 
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what A would have is not the fear of pain, but that of death, because the retention of 
information, but not that of the brain, is crucial for survival. Moreover, recall that 
since Williams believes that At and At+n are the same person, he contends that 
putting Bt and Bt+n into the picture should not affect this identity of A. Perry 
criticizes that this contention does not prove much because the relation between At 
and At+n is unclear. So Perry concludes that Williams fails in his rejection of the 
notion of 'exchanging bodies'. 
Is Perry's reading of Williams' case fair? In order to show that the physical 
body is the criterion of personal identity, Williams is supposed to discuss a case 
where there is the destruction not only of the memory, but also all other 
psychological conditions. Perry complains that Williams' notion of memory loss 
seems to suggest that some psychological traits manage to remain unchanged, 
whereas the situation in question requires a total psychological change. It is true, I 
think, that the words (amnesia，and 'memory loss，may be misleading. However, it 
is a common practice in philosophical discussions of the issues that the word 
‘memory’ is used to cover the whole mental life. So one need not, and I think 
should not, take Williams as only talking about the narrow sense of 'memory loss'. 
This is supported by the following paraphrase of Williams' case by Robert Nozick: 
[Williams presses this question with his second story.] Suppose you are told 
you will undergo terrible suffering. This prospect is frightening. You next 
receive the information that before this suffering comes, you will have 
changed enormously in psychological traits, perhaps so greatly as to possess 
exactly the character, memories, values, and knowledge of someone else 
who now is alive. This would frighten you even more，perhaps. You do not 
want to lose your character, memories, values, modes of behavior, 
knowledge, and loves - to lose your identity, as we might say - and 
afterwards to undergo enormous suffering.® 
It is worth noting that Nozick is here restating Williams' argument rather than 
making one of his own on the basis of Williams' example. So, it seems clear that 
8 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981，p.30. 
48 
Williams’ key point is that the continuily of the body is sufficient for fear being the 
proper reaction to the torture. Perry's argument against Williams' example, 
therefore, rests on an unsympathetic reading of it. 
4. Conventionalist Decision and the Best Candidate Theory 
Another criticism of Williams' argument is that he does not mention the 
other person (except the provenance of the impressions of the past I end up with) in 
Story 2. He does not mention the one who will be me (A), and that is a fact crucial 
to my identity. Williams points out that if it is so crucial for another person to 
appear, it will be definite that, unlike the previous steps, I should not fear the torture 
(or even the death) in a step where there is another person who is identified as me 
like the case of 'exchanging bodies，？ To discuss the importance (or unimportance) 
of this extra person, let us continue the story as follows: 
(vi) The same happens to me as in (v), but B is not left the same, since a 
similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction. 
• Some people think that finally I do not need to fear anymore, 
because there is the re-introduction of me as B-body-person. The 
torture on A-body-person is none of my business. Yet in fact, there is 
less difference between (v) and (vi) than between (iv) and (v). What 
is different is what happens to someone else，not to me. If I fear in 
(V)，why don't I feel the same in (vi)? 
If we pay attention to the comparison between (v) and (vi), we may find 
another problem concerning my existence (i.e., A's existence) apart from my fear 
towards the torture. ^ ^ Suppose that one describes what happens in each step as 
follows: . 
(i) A exists as A-body-person. 
(ii) It is also difficult to deny A's existence as A-body-person 
here. 
9 See Williams, 'The Self and the Future', in Problems of the Self’ pp.56-58. 
lO/A城 pp.57-58. 
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(iii) and (iv) Some people regard the cases in these two steps as borderline 
cases. A's existence is not clear. 
(V) A does not exist in this step, 
(vi) A exists as B-body-person. 
This is the description that one would give if one thinks that the existence of the 
other person is a crucial fact. Yet how can A disappear completely in (v) and then 
suddenly pop up again as a result of operation (vi)? How can we regard A，s 
existence as depending on the existence of someone else, while we can find nothing 
different about A's conditions between (v) and (vi)? A-body-person in (v) is in 
every aspect the same as that in (vi). So if A-body-person in (vi) is not A, that in (v) 
is not either. 
People who agree upon the 'conventionalist decision'" would claim that the 
existence of another person would make the whole thing different To tackle the 
problem of A's non-existence in (v)，they may suggest that since there is no other 
person who is equally or in greater degree continuous with A, A-body-person in (v) 
is identical to A. In other words, the reason for A-body-person to be A in (v) is that 
there is no competitor apart from A-body-person to claim to be A. The case in (vi) 
is different. B-body-person is a better candidate to claim to be A, so A is identical 
with B-body-person instead of A-body-person. This theory is called the ‘Best 
Candidate Theory，. 
However, how can A-body-person in (v) be regarded as, just as the Best 
Candidate Theory claims，A, simply because of the non-existence oi another person? 
Williams thinks that the ‘conventionalist，line of thinking behind the theory may be 
appropriate in some situations but certainly not so when dealing with the identity of 
a person: 
This line of talk is the sort of thing indeed appropriate to lawyers deciding 
the ownership of some property which has undergoing some bewildering set 
u The term 'conventionalist decision' can be found in Williams' paper. According to this view, 
different situations call for different descriptions. In case where one has uncertainty about how a 
situation is described, a decision is to be made. Such decision is always done by convention. Ibid, 
p.61. 
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of transformations; they just have to decide, and in each situation, let us : 
suppose, it has got to go to somebody, on as reasonable grounds as the facts 
and the law admit. But as a line to deal with a person's fears or expectations 
about his own future, it seems to have no sense at all.^ ^ 
Williams' objection, in other words, is that one's identity or survival cannot be 
dependent on the existence of another person. Whether a person begins to exist at a 
certain time should not depend on whether someone else exists at that time. 
Otherwise, it just makes our talk of identity vacuous. My identity to a future person 
requires the intrinsic features of the relation between us. It does not depend on what 
happens to other people. 
5. Conceptual Undecidabilitv 
Another criticism of Williams' position focuses on the conceptual 
undecidability involved in the case. There are borderline situations in Williams' 
example. One may therefore say that we must not insist on drawing a line regarding • 
when I cease to exist. Thus, my identity relations with the prospective sufferer of 
pain are conceptually 'shadowed'. If it is not conceptually decidable whether 1 will 
be involved or not in the torture situation, I can feel neither as I would if the 
sufferer were certainly me, nor as I would if he were certainly not. I can only have 
an ‘ambivalent concern，towards the situation, but not fear. 
Williams thinks, however, that the introduction of the undecidability does 
not dispel the fear. He first considers some cases in which one's expectation 
towards a certain situation is indeterminate. Suppose I am told that one out of five 
people will be chosen to be tortured, but have no reason to expect it to be me rather 
than one of the others. In this case, my fear will be accordingly affected by this 
indeterminacy. I would presumably be somewhat more cheerful than knowing it is 
going to be me. Or suppose I expect that something nasty, a nameless horror, is 
going to happen to me. In both cases, there is a sense in which my fear is indeed 
equivocal. Yet presumably a situation in which one's identity is conceptually 
12/關 p.61. 
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shadowed is of a different kind. It is a case in which the subject has an incurable 
difficulty about how he may think about the situation. It is like a case in which an 
object to which I am sentimentally attached to has undergone puzzling 
transformations that leaves a conceptual shadow over its identity. In such a case, I 
could neither feel about it as I did originally, nor be totally indifferent to it. I could 
only have some ambivalent distresses, but not fear, towards the future pain. 
Williams argues, however, that the analogy with the transmogrified object 
of sentiment is strained If I regard the prospective of the pain-sufferer and his pain 
in Story 2 in the same way as the transmogrified object and some damages to this 
object, I will conceive him as distinct from me and thus removed the conceptual 
shadow. But on the other hand, the analogy has not shown how I can ‘get nearer' to 
the pain-sufferer without expecting his pain. Thus, Williams contends that to view 
the case in terms of conceptual imdecidability not only fails to solve the problem of 
one's identity but would produce more puzzlements. 
6. The Relationships between Criteria and Perspectives 
Memory theorists may also raise another objection against Williams' theory, 
focusing not on his Nonduplication Argument but the very idea of using physical 
body as the criterion of personal identity. They may argue that what Williams 
discusses concerns only the identification of a person by others. Yet memory 
reveals a person to himself, so it plays an important role in the identification of 
oneself. Williams turns to this question in another paper 'Personal Identity and 
Individuation'. ^^  He guesses that what the memoiy theorists mean by the 
importance of memory can be understood in two ways: either that memory can be 
used as a criterion of personal identity; or that memory is the essence of our identity, 
for memory is what makes someone to be a certain person. From this person's own 
point of view, he might at most doubt whether a body is his and say something like, 
'This is not my body.' Yet there would never be an occasion for him to say 'These 
are not my memories.' 
“The discussion is found in the section 'Objection 3 - A criterion for oneself?' in Williams's paper, 
'Personal Identity and Individuation', in Problems of the Self, pp. 12-15. 
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Concerning the first aspect, Williams argues that it is not always true that 
someone can use memory as a criterion to identify himself. It is true that, in 
ordinary situations, a person would have no doubt about who he is if his set of 
memory is a distinct and unique one. It is different, however, in some imagined 
situations. Williams argues, first，it makes no sense to say that a person can use his 
memory to decide whether he is the same person as before, if his memoiy S is 
changed into another set SI. He would not know that there has been such a change 
because he would not doubt his identity afterward. He would have such a doubt 
only if he has both S and SI at the same time, but this contradicts the present 
hypothesis. If SI includes a general memory that he knows there is something he 
used to remember but can remember no more, it is only a condition common to 
many people. If SI includes the general memory S so that the man would remember 
something that is incompatible with SI, the most natural direction of thought of him 
is that S is an illusion. And if he is not satisfied with this conclusion, or if some 
parts of S are left over in SI that produces definitely incompatible memories, he can 
make no conclusion on which one he is. His own memories give him no help at all. 
All he can do is to consult others about his past. But in that case, he would be 
relying on other people's memories of his past, and is not using his own as the 
criterion. It then just falls back to a case of identification by others: (we are forced 
back into the world of public criteria.，^^  What self-consciousness proves are 
incapable of yielding the secret of personal identity, and so memoiy cannot be the 
criterion we want. 
The above argument can be clarified as follows. Williams thinks that 
memory theorists are wrong in insisting that memory is the criterion of self-
identification, because the underlying relationship that they believe is already 
wrong. The truth is that there is no necessary relation between the first-person point 
of view and the memory criterion, nor between the third-person point of view and 
the bodily criterion. The two stories in Williams' paper ‘The Self and the Future', 
(which are illustrated in Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter，）shows that the correct 
relations are reversed: 
“ 1關 P.15. 
The first argument, which led to the 'mentalistic' conclusion that A and B 
would change bodies and that each person should identify himself with the 
destination of his memories and character, was an argument entirely 
conducted in third-personal terms. The second argument, which suggested 
the bodily continuity identification, concerned itself with the first-personal 
issue of what A could expect ^ ^ 
The discussion on this point in the paper is brief but significant. It questions the 
common belief that a first personal approach must concentrates on mental 
considerations. In this way, self-identification can no longer be used to provide a 
ground for the memory theorists to claim that memory is the criterion of personal 
identity. 
Yet how would Williams respond to the second aspect that memory is the 
essence of one's identity then? Some memory theorists claim that memory is the 
heart of personal identity. Given that a person has certain memories, he will believe 
himself to be a particular person, with his memories as the evidence. Williams 
responds that this claim is just to limit the range within those ordinary situations 
and exclude the possibilities of having some conflicting sets of memories at the 
same time: 
It comes really to no more than the trivialities that in order to remember, you 
have to have something you can remember, and that if you are remembering 
everything you can remember, there is nothing else you can remember. ^ ^ 
Indeed, there is, I think, no real difference between saying that memory is a 
criterion and that it is an essence. An essence is that which makes a thing what it is. 
Certainly, a thing changes if the essence that determines it changes. So if memory is 
the essence that makes someone a certain person, it follows that memory can be 
used as a criterion to identify this person. Arguably it is problematic to talk about 
essence because it assumes no particular perspective, whereas criterion implies that 
someone uses it. By talking of both memoiy from the first person perspective and 
”Williams, ‘The Self and the Future', in Problems of the Self，p.62. 
16 Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', in Problems of the Self, p. 14. 
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memory as the essence of being a particular person, memory theorists are simply 
trying to get the best of both the inner world and the outer world of the 
identification of a person. 
7. Conclusion; ‘Exchanging Bodies，as an Artificial Neatness 
Williams' analysis reveals that what memory theorists try to show from the 
story of 'exchanging bodies' is not as convincing as one may think. Williams 
explains that Stoiy 1 is only designed in such a way that it seems there are body 
exchanges and that people should use memory as the criterion of personal identity. 
Such design is only an artificial neatness. The experimenter simply stops at step (vi), 
a point where it can be called 'exchanging bodies'. In fact, he could have stopped 
earlier or gone further. Against memoiy theorists，claim, Williams thinks that one's 
fear can extend to future pain whatever psychological changes precede it. It is what 
happens to the physical body that causes the fear. The continuous physical body is 
also what holds the fear across the different stages. With all that we have discussed 
in this chapter，we can conclude that Williams has made a strong case for his claim 




In the last two chapters, we discussed the two arguments by Williams. As a 
physical theorist, Williams wants to show that the continuity of the physical body is 
always both necessary and sufficient for personal identity while memory and other 
psychological considerations are not. His Reduplication Argument shows that 
memory can be duplicated, and thus that the one-to-one relation of identity cannot 
be guaranteed by the memory criterion. It is, Williams also argues, problematic to 
try to suppress the possible rival candidate(s) by limiting the number of possible 
candidates to one, as suggested by the Non-Branching Memory Theory. Besides, 
there is the intuition that one's identity should not depend on the existence or non-
existence of someone else. By contrast, the physical theory seems to provide a 
better picture. Even in the case of amoeba-like fission, the continuity of the physical 
body helps reveal the point of reduplication and answer the identity question in a 
negative way. Therefore, bodily continuity is, Williams argues, the correct criterion 
of personal identity. 
Williams' Nonduplication Argument shows that there will be cases where it 
is difficult to decide on the identity or existence of a person, if memory is used as a 
criterion. Some might regard these cases as borderline cases where there is no 
definite answer to the identity question. But this explanation will not drive our fear 
away, if we are told that our bodies are going to be in pain. After all，the quest of 
personal identity is to find an answer that is also related to one's concern of his 
existence. Williams' argument shows that we care what will happen to our bodies in 
the future, and thus that the physical body is the key factor that holds our identity 
over time. Even from the first-person perspective, we still identify ourselves with 
our bodies. Therefore, there is no necessary relation between the first-person 
perspective and the memoiy criterion or between the third-person one and the 
bodily criterion. 
The significance and problems of Williams' arguments can be shown more 
clearly through a comparison with other theories. Parfit famously holds a view very 
different from that of Williams. This chapter will focus on Parfit's reductionist 
psychological theory. Parfit thinks that psychological continuity and connectedness 
(psychological C&C) constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for one's 
survival. (Psychological continuity consists in a chain of overlapping psychological 
connections.) He first illustrates his idea with the Teletransportation example, a 
story narrated from a first-person point of view. Unlike Williams' story, it suggests 
that the protagonist should identify himself with his psychological conditions rather 
than his physical body. Parfit is also a representative of two theories that Williams 
objects to: the Non-Branching Memory Theory and the Best Candidate Theory. 
Parfit thinks that in so far as there is no branching, there is no problem with 
psychological C&C as a criterion of identity. When there is branching or 
reduplication, we can tackle the problem by invoking the Best Candidate Theory. 
He also argues that sometimes we cannot answer a question about the identity of 
some object. We, for instance, may not be able to say at which point during the 
reduplication or cell replacement a replica should be regarded as identical to the 
original person. In such cases, the question of personal identity would have to be 
answered arbitrarily. However，this does not mean what matters in survival is 
equally arbitrary. For what matters, in Parfit's view, is not identity but the relation 
of mental continuity and connectedness, a relation that lacks the formal character of 
being one-to-one as the relation of identity. 
In this chapter, I shall discuss in detail Parfit’ s idea of personal identity. 
Parfit says that his targets are two beliefs: one about the nature of personal identity 
and the other about its importance.^ I shall discuss the first in Part 2 and the second 
in Part 3. 
2. The Nature of Personal Identity 
1 Parfit, 'Personal Identity', in Perry (ed.)，Personal Identity, P. 199. These aims are also implied in 
Parfit's several other papers. 
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As a psychological Reductionist, Parfifs ideas of the nature and the 
criterion of personal identity over time 一 what this identity involves, or consists in -
are different from those who hold other views. In addition to the distinction 
between the physical criterion favored by Williams and the psychological criterion 
endorsed by Parfit, there is another distinction that is crucial for understanding 
Parfit's position on the issue. It is the distinction between Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism. According to Non-Reductionism, a person is a separately existing 
entity distinct from the brain and the body. Personal identity does not consist in the 
holding of certain relations between mental events and the bodies, but involves a 
further fact. So, the answer to any question about the identity of a person must be 
all-or-nothing. One especially significant Non-Reductionist Theory is the Ego 
Theory, (e.g., the Cartesian view), which claims that each person is a persistently 
pure mental entity - a soul or a spiritual substance. Such an ego is independent, 
indivisible and immaterial. It gives the person a sense of unity, in order to face，as a 
subject, the turbulent flow of experience. Whenever there are changes in the brain, 
body, and the like, they take place in the states of the same persisting ego. Hence, 
the existence of the ego is an irreducible and most fundamental fact of identity over 
time. 
By contrast. Reductionists believe that: 
(1) The fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of 
certain more particular facts. 
(2) These facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this 
person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person's life are 
had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These 
facts can be described in an impersonal way. 
(3) A person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and 
the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events.� 
Concerning point (3)，there are two different kinds of views. Physical theorists 
accept the physical criterion and believe that personal identity over time involves 
2 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.2l0, 211. 
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the physically continuous existence of enough of a brain so that it remains the brain 
of a living person. Psychological theorists accept the psychological criterion and 
believe that personal identity over time involves various kinds of psychological 
continuity, with the right kind of cause. This is a major difference between 
Williams' theory and Parfifs theory. 
We may further distinguish different versions of Reductionism. Identifying 
Reductionism reduces persons to bodies so strongly that it does not distinguish 
between them and thus Parfit regards it as too simple a view. Constitutive 
Reductionism, endorsed by Parfit, holds that a person is an entity that has a body, 
thoughts and other experiences. Another view is what he has called Eliminative 
Reductionism, a forerunner of which is the Buddhist's 'No Self view. As a Bundle 
Theorist, Parfit believes that there are long series of mental states and events -
thoughts, sensations, etc., with each series as one life, unified by various kinds of 
causal relation. It is like a bundle tied up with a string. The Bundle Theory denies 
that persons are separately existing entities. Indeed, it denies the existence of 
persons and says it is only a fact about our language. Like Hume, Parfit claims that 
the facts in which personal identity consists in can be described impersonally. 
Shoemaker remarks that claim has a weak and a strong readings: 
Sometimes this seems to mean something fairly weak: namely, a description 
in which there is no actual reference to any specific person. But sometimes 
he suggests something stronger, as when he says, citing Lichtenberg, that 
'because we are not separately existing entities, we could fully describe our 
thoughts without claiming that they have thinkers' (p.225 [of Reasons and 
Persons\). This suggests that the only entities referred to or quantified over 
in impersonal descriptions are entities that could exist without there being 
persons 一 just as the people who are in fact members of clubs could exist 
without there being clubs? 
3 Shoemaker, ‘Parfit on Identity', in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 
1997, p. 138. For Lichtenberg's view, see G. C. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, Sudelbucher n , 
Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971. 
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Most of us have certain beliefs about our continued existence over time, e.g.， 
the belief that our existence must be determinate; we assume that there must be an 
answer to the identity question, which must be either yes or no. We remain the same 
even if there are changes in our minds and bodies. Such beliefs are justified only if 
something like the Ego Theory is true. But Parfit points out that there is no 
empirical evidence that there are Cartesian egos and that the above beliefs are false. 
If we do not believe in Cartesian egos，we should concede that personal identity 
over time just consists in physical and/or psychological continuity. Parfit says that 
while believers in different criteria do agree about what is involved in the continued 
existence of people in most actual cases, they disagree about many imaginary ones, 
such as the famous example of Teletransportation. 
2,1 The Basic Teletransportation Case 
Some people may object that cases like Teletransportation is purely 
imaginary and cannot be used to explain any concept in the issue of personal 
identity, which is a problem of our real life. However, Parfit explains that it is worth 
considering such cases with respect to what they reveal: 
We can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe. We 
might have found that, when we consider science fiction cases, we simply 
shrug our shoulders. But that is not so. Many of us find that we have certain 
beliefs about what kind of fact personal identity is.4 
And such beliefs are best revealed in cases narrated from a first-person point of 
view, as in the basic Teletransportation story: 
I enter the Teletransporter. I have been to Mars before, but only by the old 
method, a space-ship journey taking several weeks. This machine will send 
me at the speed of light. I merely have to press the green button... When I 
press the button, I shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems 
a moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious for about an hour. The 
4 Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity', in Henry Harris (ed.)’ Identity: Essays based on Herbert 
Spencer Lectures given in the University of O^ord，Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 15. 
Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body，while recording the 
exact states of all of my cells. It will then transmit this information by radio. 
Traveling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach 
the Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out of new matter, a brain and 
body exactly like mine. It will be in this body that I shall wake up... I press 
the button. As predicted, I lose and seem at once to regain consciousness, 
but in a different cubicle. Examining my new body, I find no change at all. 
Even the cut on my upper lip, from this morning's shave, is still there.^ 
Some people believe that in a successful Teletransportation like this, it is I 
who will wake up on Mars. Teletransportation is merely a way of traveling. Some 
people hold a different view. They think that I have made a terrible mistake in 
choosing to be teletransported, because the one who wakes up on Mars is only my 
Replica, not me. I would have ceased to exist because the Replica is only 
qualitatively but not numerically identical with me. Hence, the Replica is not me. 
According to the latter view, the criterion of personal identity consists in bodily 
continuity. (Or, as some may say, the same embodied brain is what unifies the 
different experiences of a single person.) However, Parfit thinks that the criterion of 
personal identity should be based on psychological continuity, which involves 
memory, the persistence of intentions, desires, and other psychological features. 
According to Williams, one may object that identity based on psychological 
continuity is merely qualitative identity, just as two billiard balls in the same color 
are 'exactly similar' or qualitatively identical. In his paper 'Personal Identity and 
Individuation', Williams emphasizes that ‘identical，and ‘exactly similar' are 
different. When applied to mental properties, the sense of ‘sameness，can only be 
‘exact similarity，. And because of the general property of memory and character, 
the psychological criterion cannot really answer any identity question. Therefore, in 
the case of Teletransportation, my Replica and I are not identical This seems to be 
what we believe. Yet Parfit would not regard it as the correct description of the 
story. For Parfit, as it is conceivable that we shall have space (travel’ by 
Teletransportation, we should believe that one's identity can be sustained by 
psychological continuity alone. So，my Replica is identical to me. 
5 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 199. 
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2,2 The Branch-Line Teletransportation Case 
The above story may progress in a way that calls for reconsideration of 
whether I survive or die through the Teletransportation. This is what Parfit calls the 
Branch-Line Case: 
I am now back in the cubicle, ready for another trip to Mars. But this time, 
when I press the green button, I do not lose consciousness.... 'It's working', 
he [the attendant] replies, handing me a printed card. This reads: 'The New 
Scanner records your blueprint without destroying your brain and body...' 
He adds that, if I stay for an hour, I can use the Intercom to see and talk to 
myself on Mars, 
This reduplication creates a problem of how two separate individuals at two 
different places can be the same person at the same time. It is impossible for me to 
be here on Earth and also on Mars. (As we have seen, it is exactly an analogous 
point that Williams objected to using his Reduplication Argument.) This seems to 
show that psychological considerations are not sufficient for personal identity. In 
response to this objection, Parfit proposes the No-Branching Theory. This theory 
incorporates into the psychological C&C criterion a 'no-branching' provision (or a 
'no-competitors' clause): 'X and Y are the same person if they are psychologically 
continuous and no person who is contemporary with either and psychologically 
continuous with the other.，Or in terms of Judith Jarvis Thomson's more precise 
formulation, the revised criterion is as follows: 
Psychological Criterion (Connectedness without Competitors): x=yif and only 
if 
(a) there are times t and t' such that 少 is at t' psychologically connected with x at 
t, and 
6 两 p. 199. 
(b) there is no z of which the following is the case: Not-(z = y) and there are 
times t and t' such that z is at t' psychologically connected with x at t? 
Therefore, psychological C&C with the right kind of cause, (or as Parfit calls it. 
Relation R) is sufficient for personal identity, provided that this relation does not 
take a branching form. When there is branching, we should be concerned with both 
of the resulting people, e.g., my Replica and me in the Branch-Line case. Yet how 
can I be satisfied with such a conclusion? Why do I need to share people's concern 
on me with another one? 
Worse still, this concern may even be shifted totally to that another one. 
This can be seen from the version of Teletransportation in which the story ends with 
the attendant telling me of an accident. He said, 
‘I，m afraid that we're having problems with the New Scanner. It records 
your blueprint just as accurately, as you will see when you talk to yourself 
on Mars. But it seems to be damaging the cardiac systems which it scans. 
Judging from the results so far, though you will be quite healthy on Mars, 
here on Earth you must expect cardiac failure within the next few days.'^ 
What would this mean to me? Am I going to die? Or will 'my Replica' continue to 
survive as ‘me，？ There are two different views on this case. Science fiction fans 
may believe that my Replica would be me. Other people may believe that I am 
dying. My Replica is someone else, who has been made to be exactly like me. 
According to Parfit, there is no problem in regarding my Replica as the original me. 
Parfit does not state explicitly that we should make a decision based on the Best 
Candidate Theory, but it seems his reasoning is in line with the theory, which 
supports the view that my Replica will be the best candidate as me in the future. 
Besides inheriting my past, Parfit thinks, my Replica will also ‘live，my fixture. 
After I have ‘died，from cardiac &ilure, she will go on living my life, taking up my 
rights and responsibilities of every aspect, believing herself to be me: 
7 Thomson said that the no-competitors-clause has to contain a non-identity-clause, Not-(z =>»). The 
problem of such inclusion will be discussed in the next chapter. Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘People and 
their Bodies', in Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, p.214. 
8 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.200. 
My Replica then assures me that [s]he will take up my life where I leave off. 
[S]he loves my wife[husband], and together they will care for my children. 
And [s]he will finish the book that I am writing. Besides having all of my 
drafts, [s]he has all of my intentions. I must admit that [s]he can finish my 
book as well as 1 could. ^  
Other people, including even my husband and children, will not recognize any 
difference between their original wife or mother and the Replica. In other words, 
everyone, except me, will regard the Replica to be identical with the original me, 
from both the first-person perspective (of the Replica) and the third-person 
perspective (of others). There are various psychological connections that hold 
between my Replica and me. She will live my life exactly in the way I shall live. 
All these are good reasons to regard my Replica as the best candidate. So I need not 
be worried so much about my 'death'. 
As discussed in the two previous chapters, Williams objects to the two 
theories that Parfit holds: the Best Candidate Theory and the Non-Branching 
Memory Theory. Besides, some may object that although my Replica is fully 
psychologically continuous with me’ this continuity does not have a normal cause. 
Parfit replies that in an account of what matters in survival, the right kind of cause 
can be any cause. Anyhow, Parfit points out that what I am objecting is not merely 
the cause, but also that this cause will not get me to Mars]� I understand that my 
Replica will play my role very well. Yet, I think, it is still hard for me to accept that 
my Replica will replace my positioa Psychological C&C are not equivalent to 
subjective linkage. I do not only want to have someone to love my husband and 
children in the way I do，but I, as the very subject of my life and experience, want to 
love them myself, feel the family love, and 1 loath to part with them. I do not only 
want to have someone continuous with me, but I want to be this future person. So 
9 From here I shall change the sex of the protagonist in the story into feminine in order to make it 
more convenient for my discussion. Ibidy p.201. 
See Parfit, 'Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons', in Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. 
Zimmerman (ed.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Maiden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998, p.315. 
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from my own point of view and taking my own feelings and experience into 
consideration, how can I be satisfied with the answer that my Replica will be me?" 
Z5 Physical Spectrum and Combined Spectrum 
One may find Parfit's view unsatisfactory, but he argues that he is not 
giving an answer and explaining personal identity at the level of what matters. At 
this level, Parfit claims that our (true) nature is totally different from what most of 
us believe - that the nature of our identity through time guarantees a definite answer 
to any identity question. Parfit agrees that in ordinary cases, questions about 
identity do have definite answers, but it is a false belief that one's identity is always 
determinate, especially in the ‘problem cases' where one's identity and the facts (or 
relations) in which identity consists do not coincide. According to Reductionism, 
one's existence just consists in the existence of a brain, a body and the occurrence 
of the interrelated physical and mental events. Such particular fects only roughly 
coincide with 'identity'. While 'identity' is all-or-nothing, survival may not be so 
because most relations that matter in survival are relations of degree. Non-
Reductionists, on the contrary, claim that a person is a separately existing entity 
whose existence admits of no degrees. If Non-Reductionism is true, then personal 
identity is determinate. Parfit takes as his major task establishing Reductionism by 
showing that personal identity is indeterminate in some cases, thus refuting Non-
Reductionism. 
A profitable way to achieve this task is to use a psychological spectrum to 
show how personal identity can vary in degrees with the gradual change of one's 
psychological conditions. However, Williams has shown with his series of cases^^ 
that a psychological spectrum, indeed, leads to an opposite conclusion: Even at the 
far end where the psychological conditions are completely different from those at 
the beginning, we still believe that the future person is oneself. So personal identity 
is determinate from the beginning till the end of the spectrum. Therefore, 
“ I shall take up this point again in the next chapter. There will be more discussions about the 
subject of experience and subjective linkage. 
These series of cases are what I called 'Story 2，in Chapter Two, which is about how I would, with 
my psychology keeps changing, think of the foture torture of my present body. See Williams, 'The 
Sdf and the Future', in Problems of the Self, pp.51-52. 
psychological C&C is not necessary while the physical body, which is held constant, 
is sufficient for personal identity. To counter Williams' argument, Parfit discusses 
the Physical Spectrum. It is a derivation of the Teletransportation story - a range of 
cases in which psychological C&C are held constant while the degree of bodily 
continuity is varied: 
In each of these cases, some proportion of my body would be replaced, in a 
single operation, with exact duplicates of the existing cells. In the case at the 
near end of this range, no cells would be replaced. In the case at the far end, 
my whole body would be destroyed and replicated, b 
If Williams' reasoning is used, the two 'Spectrum' arguments will lead to 
incompatible conclusions as to which the resulting person is me and which 
condition, physical or psychological continuity, is critical. For it would be plausible 
to say that if 100% of my cells were replaced, the result would be a replica; and that 
if only 1% is replaced, the resulting person would still be me. But then at some 
point between these two ends, my identity would either be indeterminate or there is 
a sharp borderline where I change into my Replica. Williams would not have 
accepted either of these options. So he would have to say that the Replica would be 
me. The Physical Spectrum seems to show that, pace Williams, physical continuity 
is not necessary for personal identity and that psychological continuity would be 
sufficient. 
However, one may question whether Parfit's spectrum is what a ‘physical 
spectrum' should be if it is to be parallel to Williams'. In Williams' case, the 
psychological change of the person is carried out step by step till the end. So why 
isn't the Physical Spectrum the same? A parallel spectrum should rather be like this: 
Besides having the surgeon replace one small set of my brain with a functionally 
equivalent set of artificial cells in the case of the near end and replace all my brain 
cells in the case at the far end, there should be an additional condition: We may 
imagine that such a replacement is a long process, but throughout the process, in 
order to make sure that each step is done correctly, I am kept conscious. In Parfifs 
”Parfit, ‘The Unimportance of Identity', in Harris (ed.), Identity: Essays based on Herbert Spencer 
Lectures given in the University of Chrford, p.20. 
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version, the person at the far end would not be me. But as what is depicted above, / 
am conscious all through the experiment, so that when my body-person is asked 
who she is at each step, I will report that it is me. In this version, the case at the far 
end is radically different from the case of Teletransportation, which is equivalent to 
the case at the far end in Parfit's versioa Actually, there are three alternatives as to 
what we believe about this range of cases. Besides (a) Parfifs reductionist account 
and (b) the belief that in all of these cases, the resulting person would be me, there 
is also (c) the belief that there is a sharp borderline between the 100% case and the 
case at the near end. Of these three alternatives, (b) seems to be the most plausible 
for most people. But on Parfifs version, (b) emerges as the least plausible. Parfit 
might object that in our version, the 100% case is like the case of the Ship of 
Theseus, where there is still physical continuity between the case at the near end 
and that at the far end. However, what he aims at is rather a case where there is no 
physical continuity. For example, his Teletransportation Stoiy involves no physical 
continuity to any degree as my brain and body are completely destroyed and my 
Replica is created out of new matters. This is true. However, this shows neither that 
physical continuity is unnecessary nor that psychological continuity is sufficient. 
First of all，we do not believe that my Replica is me in the Teletransportation Case. 
Moreover, in those cases where replacement is less than 100%, we believe that 
there is personal identity because there is physical continuity. Given these two 
points, it is true to say that (c) a sharp borderline can be drawn between 99% and 
100%; and we have to jump from one kind of case of replacement to a totally 
different kind, where physical continuity ceases to obtain. In short, personal identity 
is in any case either yes or no, and physical continuity still seems to be a necessary 
condition of personal identity. 
Now if we still do not agree that it would be me at the far end, Parfit would 
ask us to consider the Combined Spectrum. This spectrum is the range of cases in 
which both physical continuity and psychological C&C are gradually reduced until 
a point where the resulting person is someone whose body and psychological make-
up are exactly like those of another person: 
In this second range of cases, there would be all the different degrees of 
both physical and psychological connectedness. The new cells would not be 
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exactly similar. The greater the proportion of my body that would be 
replaced, the less like me would the resulting person be. In the case at the far 
end of this range, my whole body would be destroyed, and they would make 
a Replica of some quite different person, such as Greta Garbo. Garbo，s 
Replica would clearly not be me. In the case at the near end, with no 
replacement, the resulting person would be me.i^ 
When we consider this Combined Spectrum, we must concede that the resulting 
person at the far end is in every aspect different from me. This spectrum 
undermines the common assumption that personal identity must be determinate. In 
this way, Non-Reductionism is proved to be false and so a person cannot be an 
independently existing entity, such as a Cartesian ego. Or to put it in the other way, 
if we do not believe in Cartesian egos, then we should give up some of our beliefs. 
First，only those who believe in Cartesian egos think that a person cannot be 
reduced into physical and/or psychological facts. Yet if we are not persistently and 
purely mental things, then we must admit that there may be no answer to some 
identity questions. In these cases, when we know the relevant facts about our 
physical bodies, our psychological conditions and the related events, we know 
everything there is to know at the level of what happens. Questions about identity in 
these cases are only conceptual, or verbal questions. We should not try to explain 
these relevant facts in terms of ownership, with a Cartesian ego as the owner and 
the facts as its properties. Second, if we are not an independently and inseparably 
immaterial substance, then we should also give up the idea that identity must be all-
or-nothing. 
2.4 Personal Identity: A Conceptual or Linguistic Issue 
One may feel puzzled about having no definite answer to the question of his 
identity. We are concerned about the identity problem, but Parfit says that it is only 
a bafflement of concern. To illustrate this point, Parfit writes: 
�”bid p.2l. 
Suppose that a certain club exists for several years, holding regular meetings. 
The meetings then cease. Some years later, some of the members of this 
club form a club with the same name, and the same rules. We ask: ‘Have 
these people reconvened the very same club? Or have they merely started up 
another club, which is exactly similar?'^ ^ 
We may not be able to provide answers to the above questions. Yet we know 
everything about the club: its meetings, members, rules, so on and so forth, even if 
we are not sure about its identity. The identity is indeterminate. Therefore, the 
above questions are empty and the claim, 'This is the same club，，is neither true nor 
false. 
Parfit wants us to understand that it is enough to know the relevant facts of a 
certain thing or person in which identity consists. For example, to know the facts 
about nations is to know the facts about their citizens and their territoiy. Similarly, 
to know the facts about people, we must know the facts about the relevant physical 
and mental conditions. Such facts are enough for the description of identity. 
According to Parfit, personal identity can be described impersonally, (more 
specifically in terms of non-branching psychological C&C). A description of the 
reality is complete if it states, implies or enables us to know about the existence of 
everything that exists. Therefore, according to Reductionism, even when a person 
exists, we can still give a complete and adequate description of reality without 
claiming that the person exists. In Williams' Reduplication Case and Parfit's 
Teletransportation Story, though we do not know how to answer the identity 
questions, we know all the relevant facts about psychological continuity, such as 
'both Charles and Robert are psychologically continuous with Fawkes，and 'my 
Replica is psychologically continuous with me and will continue to live my life.' 
We know all the facts that we need to know. Any remaining questions about 
identity such as ‘Will that person be me?, are not further questions about what 
really happens. 
”Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.213. 
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Those who think otherwise might feel that a decision has to be made - my 
Replica is either identical with me or not identical with me. In the range of cases in 
the Nonduplication Argument, Williams thinks that we cannot simply regard Steps 
3 and 4 as borderline cases. In those two steps, I must either exist or not exist ^ ^ 
Parfit agrees that in some contexts, for instance the legal one, we may need definite 
answers to identity questions, but they are mere decisions for convenience, although 
we naturally assume that questions about personal identity are about different 
possibilities: the resulting person might be me, or she might be someone else. But 
on a Reductionist view, these questions are not about different possibilities at the 
level of what really happens. To say that 'the resulting person is me’ or that 'she is 
someone else' is to give two descriptions of the same facts. Questions about identity 
are more appropriately rephrased as (if we know everything about the facts of 
psychological C&C): 'Do I call that person me?，or ‘Would it be correct to call that 
person me?' i.e., as explicitly, linguistic or conceptual questions about the concept 
of a person. Answers to such questions would not give us any new information 
apart from some about our language, as in the following case about ‘the identity，of 
a copse: 
Suppose that I already know that several trees are growing together on some 
hill. I then leam that, because that is true, there is a copse on this hill. That 
would not be new factual information, I would have merely leamt that such 
a group of trees can be called a (copse，. My only new information is about 
our language. That those trees can be called a copse is not, except trivially, a 
fact about the trees, i? 
Hence，going back to the Spectra discussed above, Parfit points out that it is 
merely a conceptual question whether the resulting person would be me. At the 
conceptual level, we may want to decide on a point between 1% and 100% for 
calling the resulting person ‘me，. But at the level of what happens, on the other 
hand, we should simply conclude that identity is indeterminate in some cases. 
For details, see Chapter Two of this thesis or Williams, ‘The Self and the Future', in Problems of 
汝 优 pp.192-193. 
” Parfit, 'The Unimportance of Identity', in Harris (ed.)，Identity: Essays based on Herbert Spencer 
Lectures given in the University of Oxford, pp. 19-20. 
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3. The (UnVImportance of Personal Identity 
Parfit claims that if one knows enough facts that are going to happen about 
his psychological C&C, it does not matter if he does not know whether he is to live 
or to die. However, in the natural view, people believe that personal identity is of 
great rational and moral significance to matters concerning their own life and death. 
A person concerns about the future just because it is his future. Parfit holds a 
different view. For him, it is irrational to care a great deal about personal identity 
per se. What matters in survival should rather be relation R - psychological C&C 
that holds together different parts of a person's life, with the right kind of cause, 
even when R does not constitute identity because of branching. Parfit argues tbat: (a) 
Personal identity just consists in certain other facts, (and for him, such facts are 
about psychological C&C.) (b) If one fact just consists in certain others，it can only 
be these other facts that have rational and moral importance. We should ask if these 
other facts matter in themselves, (c) Hence, personal identity cannot be rationally 
and morally important. What matters can only be one or more of the other facts in 
which personal identity consists. To argue that identity is not what matters, Parfit 
has asked us to consider the following interesting cases. 
3J Cases of Brain Operation 
Suppose that, because of damage to my spine, I have become partly 
paralyzed I have a brother [sister], who is dying of a brain disease. With the 
aid of new techniques, when my brother's [sister's] brain ceases to function, 
my head could be grafted onto the rest of my brother's [sister's] body. Since 
we are identical twins, my brain would then control a body that is just like 
mine, except that it would not be paralyzed ^ ^ 
Some might say that I should not receive the transplant operation because the body 
being my sister's, the resulting person would be my sister and I would die; or I 
should not because it is uncertain what would happen and it is indeterminate 
whether the resulting person is me. However, Parfit reminds us that I have known 
� ” m p.34. 
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enough to make me regard the operation favorably. The resulting person would 
believe that she is me. She would remember living my life. She would be in every 
way psychologically like me, with the normal cause, - the continued existence of 
enough of my brain. Physically, we are alike as we are twins. Putting all these 
factors under consideration, that life is what I myself would live. So it is irrelevant 
whether this person would be me. We can simply regard the transplant as receiving 
a new torso and new limbs like any ordinary organ transplant. Even if the person 
would not be me, this would be outweighed by the fact that the person would not be 
paralyzed. The operation preserves what matters in survival, and the relation 
between me and the person who will have received the operation contains all that 
matters. Whether that person will be me is only a conceptual question that does not 
need an answer. But if we can keep our mind clear about what matters, then we 
would be able not to mind much about identity and reject the bodily criterion. 
I 
Parfit also argues that psychological continuity will suffice for identity even 
when it is without its ‘normal cause': 
Assume, once again, that I need surgery. All of my brain cells have a defect 
which, in time, would be fatal. Surgeons could replace all these cells, 
inserting new cells that are exact replicas, except that they have no defect. 
The surgeons could proceed in either of two ways. In Case One, there would 
be a hundred operations. In each operation, the surgeons would remove a 
hundredth part of my brain, and insert replicas of those parts. In Case Two, 
the surgeons would first remove all the existing parts of my brain and then 
insert all of their replicas. ^ ^ 
Case One is close to our ordinary survival with the cells renewing gradually. Most 
people would think that the same brain exists and that I would still be alive. But 
they may think that Case Two is different as it is like Teletransportation. I die as the 
brain ceases to exist and a new brain is then given. This shows that the problem of 
speed would affect the conclusion we make. If the cells are changed over the course 
of, say, ten years, we might think that the original I exist. If they are changed over 
械 p.38. 
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ten hours, the original I would be dead. But according to Reductionism, the brain in 
both cases is without defect and is psychologically continuous with me. Whether 
the resulting person is identical with me does not matter as long as there is survival 
in both cases. 
3.2 Cases of Duplication 
Medical evidences have shown that people can survive with psychological 
change to a certain extent. We can imagine that the two halves of the brain can each 
fully support ordinary psychological fimctioning. Suppose my sister has lost the use 
of half of her brain through injury. The injured half is destroyed while the other half 
is transplanted into an empty skull of a body. My sister is then saved. If a person 
can survive with half of the brain, we can also imagine a case in which my sister's 
brain is not injured and both halves are transplanted into different but very similar 
bodies. We may conclude that there are two persons physically and psychologically 
like my sister and both of them survived In the * Single，Case, identity matters. In 
the ‘Double’ or 'Division' Case, if each of the person is my sister, there would be 
the contradiction that the two different persons are not the same as each other while 
they are the same person as my sister. If both persons are not my sister, then my 
sister would not exist anymore. Yet she does survive. The nature of the relations 
between my sister and the resulting person(s) in the single and double cases are the 
same. The only difference is the number of the resulting persons, but that does not 
matter because there is survival in the Double Case. 
Knowing that it can be hard for us to accept his view that identity does not 
matter, Parfit uses the following analogy to make it easier to see why his view is 
correct: 
Imagine a community of persons who are like us, but with two exceptions. 
First, because of facts about their reproductive system, each couple has only 
two children, who are always twins. Second, because of special features of 
their psychology, it is of great importance for the development of each child 
20 These are also cases by Parfit, only that I have changed the sex of the example from masculine to 
feminine for the convenience of my presentation. Ibid, pp.41-44. 
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that it should not, through the death of its sibling, become an only child. 
Such children suffer psychological damage. It is thus believed, in this 
community, that it matters greatly that each child should have a twin. Now 
suppose that, because of some biological change, some of the children in 
this community start to be bom as triplets. Should their parents think this a 
disaster, because these children don't have twins? Clearly not... None of 
them will suffer damage as an only child... These people should revise their 
view. What matters isn't having a twin: it is having at least one sibling.^ ^ 
Analogously, what matters in survival is not that there will be someone alive who 
will be me, but that there is at least one person who is psychologically continuous 
with me. When there is one such person, she is described as me. When there are two, 
we cannot claim that each will be me. This fact is a trivial one, just as it is trivial to 
say that my two identical siblings cannot be called my twins. So if my mind is 
divided with the two streams of consciousness embodied separately, the question 
that I should care most is 'Do I survive?' The answer to this question is positive, 
only that I survive in two bodies. This is the way I survive; how I survive, by 
comparison, is a trivial question. 
If a man regards his duplication as death: 
He would be like a man who, when told of a drug that could double his 
years of life, regarded the taking of this drug as death. The only difference 
in the case of division is that the extra years are to run concurrently. This is 
an interesting difference. But it cannot mean that there are no years to run. 22 
As Parfit has noted, his example is similar to Wiggins' derivation of Shoemaker's 
Brownson Case: 
We suppose that my brain is transplanted into someone else's (brainless) 
body, and that the resulting person has my character and apparent memories 
of my life... Wiggins then imagined his own operation. My brain is divided, 
21 Ibid, P.43. 
22 Parfit ‘Personal Identity', in Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, p.205. 
lA 
and each half is housed in a new body. Both resulting people have my 
character and apparent memories of my life,; 
There are three possibilities concerning my existence. First, I do not survive. But 
how could a double success be a failure? Second, I survive as one of the two people. 
But what can make me one rather than the other? Third, I survive as both. The 
operation gives me two bodies and a divided mind. This is the most probable 
possibility. If survival implies identity, then this description makes no sense. So the 
description is not really relevant to the problem of identity. Wiggins' case shows 
that we should abandon the language of identity as we can claim that I survive as 
two different people without implying that I am these people. This makes 
implausible the belief in the necessity of a determinate answer to the identity 
question. It is common that people use the ‘language of identity' to imply 
psychological continuity. Parfit thinks that, given that there will be someone alive 
tomorrow who will be psychologically connected with me, it is irrational for me to 
care whether that person will be me. 
In other words, in terms of his example, Parfit's argument against the 
importance of identity involves the following two premises: 
(a) the survivor in the single brain-transplant Shoemaker's Case is me, and 
(b) neither survivor in the double brain-transplant Wiggins' Case is me， 
(according to the No-Branching Theory.) 
Thomson, however, argues that the argument is not sound because of the 
imacceptability of the premises. First, it is implausible, she argues, that tinkering 
with the brain in a certain body would result in a new person. She said, 
...If a doctor tells us we will die this afternoon, but that someone else, 
exactly one, will be alive tomorrow who will then be psychologically 
connected with us today, most of us do not reply 'You're suffering from 
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metaphysical confusion, for if there'll be exactly one it'll be me', but instead, 
'Well, I suppose that isn't nothing, but it isn't much,.24 
Second, as it has been noted in our discussion of Thomson's definition of the 
psychological criterion��the no-competitors-clause need to contain a non-identity-
clause: not-(z = y)，but it seems unsatisfactoiy to include a non-identity-clause as 
part of the definition of the criterion of identity. 
Anyhow, Parfit says that judgments of personal identity are important 
simply because they imply psychological continuity: 
That is why, whenever there is such continuity, we ought, if we can, to 
imply it by making a judgment of identity. If psychological continuity took a 
branching form, no coherent set of judgments of identity could correspond 
to, and thus be used to imply, the branching form of this relation. But what 
we ought to do, in such a case, is take the importance which would attach to 
a judgment of identity and attach this importance directly to each limb of the 
branching relation. ^ ^ 
Hence, to use Williams' case, we can use psychological continuity as the ground of 
judgment and identify Charles as Guy Fawkes when Charles alone is involved. 
After Robert is introduced into the stoiy, we should switch our attention from 
identity to what really matters at the level of what happens, i.e., psychological 
continuity. Since both Charles and Robert contain all that matter in the ordinary 
case of survival, we can say that one person - Fawkes, survives as two. 
5.5 Survival and its Moral Significance 
As we have seen, Parfifs theory denies the importance of personal identity 
and shifts the focus to psychological C&C and survival Following this line of 
thought, even in the (ordinary) case where the future person is myself, I am justified 
狄 Ibid, p.221. 
“See Part 2 Section 2.2 of this chapter. 
站 Parfit, 'Personal Identity', in Perry (ed ). Personal Identity, p.207. 
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in having less concern of a remote person-stage because the degree of 
connectedness is less, I can treat different parts of my life as if they were different 
people. So it is not irrational for me to favor my future Tuesday more (if this day is 
particularly important to me), or to concern a particular part of my life more (e.g., 
that with greater connectedness to my present stage.) Moreover, the 'boundaries 
between people' should have less moral significance than we believe. However, this 
attitude seems to have the undesirable implication that we could care less about 
those who are less closely psychologically connected to us. Moreover, Susan Wolf 
criticizes that our love and friendship would be shorted lived if we ceased to care 
about identity, since love and friendship will not sustain in a remote Relation R. 
They would be easily destroyed by changes in our family and friends. We would 
also be encouraged to accomplish less in order to avoid psychological change while 
such change means 'death'.^^ In response to the first criticism, Parfit says that even 
short rivers may run deep. A l t h o _ changes in people may remove the causes of 
love, they do not affect what these causes are. Even if there are bad effects, e.g., our 
affection for other people becoming fragile, they are outweighed by the lessening of 
our selfish concern. Regarding the point of psychological change as death, people 
think that division is a bad thing for me since it means I will cease to exist. But if 
this were so，then ordinary survival would also be as bad as division or 
Teletransportation. Parfit suggests that we think in the other way round: in case of 
division or Teletransportation, I will go on living as two people or as my Replica, 
and my prospect is in fact as good (or as bad) as ordinary survival. 
Therefore, Parfit points out that it would be better for us if we could change 
our beliefs and accept the Reductionist view. Certain moral questions presuppose 
identity and it is natural for people to assume the importance of personal identity. 
Yet if we can be freed from this supposition, the question about personal identity 
would have no further interest, and thus our attitude to issues like aging and death 
would be changed. We want to survive so that our hopes and ambitions will be 
achieved. But most of us would think that if my Replica would take up my life, I 
would not look forward to that life. So what is important to survival should be 
幻 This criticism can be found in Parfit, 'Comments', Ethics, Vol.96, July 1986, pp.833-837; 
reprinted in Noonan (ed.). Personal Identity, Aldershot, Hants, England; Hong Kong: Dartmouth, 
1993, pp.290-294. 
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psychological C&C, not identity as such. It is an illusion to believe that identity is 
an independent issue. Our conceptual scheme is the cause of the illusion. We 
mistake conceptual facts for facts about reality, especially when the facts are loaded 
with emotional or moral significance. So instead of saying ‘I shall be dead' in cases 
like Teletransportation, a better description would be ‘My death disappears.' 
4. Conclusion 
Hence, going back to the Spectra discussed above, Parfit points out that it is 
merely a conceptual question whether the resulting person would be me. At the 
conceptual level, we may want to decide on a point between 1% and 100% for 
calling the resulting person (me，. At the level of what happens, we should simply 
conclude that identity is indeterminate in some cases. Some people find it hard to 
believe, especially from the first-person point of view, as their emotions would 
revolve around what they can expect, as Williams says. They insist that there must 
be a sharp borderline or some critical percentage. But how can a few cells more or a 
few less make a difference? Besides, no one could ever be in a position to answer 
the identity problem in the problem cases. For example, in the Physical Spectrum, 
the resulting person would believe himself to be me and no one is going to notice 
any differences between my Replica and me. Hence, in all such cases, questions 
about identity are entirely empty questions about reality. To decide on an answer is 
merely to choose one of the different descriptions of the fects. This is merely a 
choice about language. At the level of what happens, there is only a single 
possibility or course of events, and I know everything even though the 




THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE'S IDENTITY 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter One, we lay out the Reduplication Argument and show how 
psychological continuity fails to be the criterion of personal identity in case of 
branching. In Chapter Two, the psychological spectrum in Williams， 
Nonduplication Argument shows that personal identity cannot be decided on the 
best candidate view nor regarded as an indeterminate matter and left undecided as 
borderline cases, because these methods would not solve one's problem concerning 
his identity. Great puzzlement would be created in him and he would have his 
emotion revolving around whatever happens on him in the future, in which his 
identity is crucial. In order to highlight the uniqueness of Williams' theory, I 
introduce and discuss Parfit's theory of personal identity in Chapter Three. Being a 
Reductionist, Parfit thinks that, since one's psychological continuity and 
connectedness is sufficient, while his physical continuity is not, for sustaining his 
identity over time even in some far-fetched imaginary cases, it should be taken as 
the criterion of personal identity. His inclusion of the no-branching condition to the 
criterion and his inclination to the best candidate v i e w � i n particular, refute 
Williams' arguments. 
With reference to the duplication problem that Williams has posed to the 
psychological view of personal identity, Parfit has made three points to defend his 
theory: 
(a) Psychological C&C is a sufficient and necessary condition of personal 
identity, except that it cannot provide a good answer to the identity question 
in case of duplication or branching. So instead of responding directly to the 
1 Parfit does not say that his theory is a Best Candidate Theory but the two views are similar. 
86S 
branching problem, Parfit revises his criterion into no-branching 
psychological C&C to limit its application. With the supplement of the 'no-
branching' clause, psychological C&C is the criterion of personal identity in 
non-branching cases. 
However, this is also to say that the psychological criterion is not applicable to 
other cases. If psychological C&C loses its universal quality, it can only be a 
criterion of personal identity in a weak sense. 
(b) To deal with the remaining cases - cases of duplication - Parfit adopts a 
view which is a variant of the Best Candidate Theory. He said that the most 
important thing concerning my identity is to have someone psychologically 
continuous with me. There should be nothing to be sad about if there are in 
future two people psychologically continuous with me. And if, for instance, 
in the Branch-Line version of the Teletransportation Story where my 
Replica continues to survive while I die, my Replica can substitute me 
because she is the best candidate to play my role. Psychological C&C is the 
key to determine who the best candidate is. 
(Of course I can be my own best candidate if I am in a situation where I myself 
have a better claim, and I will cease to exist when I die if I have no Replica,) 
According to this view, my identity depends on an external fact 一 the existence or 
non-existence of a rival candidate. Yet it seems highly counterintuitive that my own 
identity should depend upon the existence of someone else and to accept that the 
best candidate to be the future me may not be me\ We believe there is intrinsicness 
in one's own identity. This is also a criticism against the Non-Branching Memory 
Theory because the theory implies that my identity depends on the (external) fact 
that there is not another person who claims to be the person I claim to be. 
(c) In some cases, such as the branching one, psychological C&C and identity, 
(which is a one-to-one relation with intrinsicness,) do not overlap. For 
instance, if I am not dying in the Branch-Line Teletransportation Case, my 
Replica and I would have the equal claim to be the best candidate of the 
original ‘me，. But in such case, Parfit claims that it is not identity per se, but 
SO 
psychological C&C that matters, because identity is only a concept required 
at the linguistic level Failing to have someone identical with me in the 
future does not mean I am dead. For example, in a branching case, no single 
future person can be said to be identical with me. Yet, provided I have the 
same relation to each of the future people as the one that matters and is 
obtained between the existing me now and the future me in ordinary cases of 
survival guaranteed by identity 一 in other words psychological C&C, I shall 
survive. Thus, duplication is, in fact, as good as ordinary survival. 
If psychological C&C is what matters for one's survival, personal identity is an 
indeterminate matter and can be decided on the basis of the best candidate principle. 
It admits of degrees and borderline cases, too. In this way, many of our basic beliefs 
about our identity should be changed. But can we really be satisfied without an 
answer to our own identity? 
In the following parts I shall further examine Williams' view by showing how 
one may respond to the three points above in light of Williams' theory and also 
other arguments by Williams and/or other people. Part 2 is about the problem of the 
Non-Branching Theory, focusing on the debate on the dependence on external facts 
between the Best Candidate Theory (and also the Non-Branching Memory Theory) 
and Williams' Principle of Intrinsicness. Part 3 reexamines the importance of 
personal identity in terms of the notions of a subjective linkage and the first person. 
My aim is not to defend Williams against all objections, because I agree that 
Williams' theory does have its shortcomings. One can thus see the main task in this 
chapter as rather to elaborate Williams' theory through the discussion of Parfit，s 
opposing views and show that personal identity matters. 
2. The Dependence on External Facts Versus the Principle of Intrinsicness 
2,1 The Non-Branching Memory Theory 
In this part I shall discuss two problems of the Non-Branching Memory 
Theory. I shall start with a critical remark about the non-branching clause as a 
provision added to the psychological criterion. 
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Recall that psychological C&C criterion says that x = y if and only if: 
(a) there are times t and t � s u c h that y is at t�psychologically 
[continuous and] connected with x at t 
To deal with the possibility of branching, one may add the following 'no-branching' 
clause; 
(b) there is no z of which the following is the case: Not-(z = y) and there 
are times t and t�such t at z is at t�psychologically [continuous and] 
connected with x at t.^  
As pointed out, there is a difficulty that has not been adequately appreciated. The 
non-branching provision (b), as we can see, contains a non-identity clause 'Not-(z = 
y)，. This immediately gives rise to the problem of circularity. As Thomson says: 
...If we are in search of criteria which tell us under what conditions x is 
identical with y, we should surely not be satisfied with one that requires that 
we know independently under what conditions z is not identical with y.^  
The circularity problem aside, there is another, deeper problem with the 
Non-Branching Memory Theory. Recall that Williams' Reduplication Argument 
argues that Charles should not be identified with Fawkes because there is，or 
possibly is, another equally good candidate who can be identified with Fawkes. To 
deal with this problem, Parfit suggests that a psychological theory of personal 
identity must incorporate a non-branching clause. Williams finds this suggestion 
absurd as it implies that the identity of a person can be extrinsically determined 
Indeed, it seems very plausible to claim that whether a person will be a certain 
person in the future should depend upon the intrinsic features of the relation 
between them. In other words, personal identity must be based on the Principle of 
21 am following Thomson's formulations here. See Thomson, ‘People and their Bodies', in Dancy 
fed.), Reading Parfit, p.214. 
^ Ibid, p.214. 
Intrinsicness, or in Wiggins' term. The Only x and y Principle. According to the 
principle, a relation R constitutes the identity of x and y only if the holding of R 
between x and y does not depend upon the existence or non-existence of any other 
person. 
Nozick has given the following, more precise version of the principle: 
If X at time tl is the same individual as y at later time t2, that can depend 
only upon facts about x, y, and the relationships between them. No fact 
about any other existing thing is relevant to (deciding) whether x at tl is 
(part of the same continuing individual as) y at t2.4 
One may think that this version is too weak. If there could ever be such an ‘other， 
person so that there would not be 'identity', (a one-to-one relation), then, one may 
argue, there is no identity, even though no 'other' person actually exists. Thus, as 
Nozick has noted, there is another related principle, which is stronger: 
If y at time t2 is (part of the same continuing individual as) x at tl，in virtue 
of standing in some relationship R to x at tl, then there could not be another 
additional thing at t2 also standing (along with y) in R to x at tl. If there also 
were this additional thing z at t2, then neither it nor y would be identical to x. 
If that z could exist, even if it actually does not, then y at t2 is not identical 
with X at tl - at least, it is not in virtue of standing in the relationship R , 
Having formulated these two principles, Nozick goes on to unpack Williams' idea. 
He says that we are prone to think that a person could enter a machine, disappear 
there, and then appear in another machine ten feet to the left, without ever having 
occupied any intervening space. And Williams* aim is to ask us to imagine that 
there had also been one more machine ten feet to the right In this machine appeared 
at the same time another person who is qualitatively identical to the original person. 
Yet neither of these two men would be the original one. If the person on the left is 
not the original person in the case of double materialization, then neither is he in the 
4 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p.31. 
^ Ibid 1^31. 
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first case where only he appears. The mere possibility of the appearance of a rival 
candidate is enough to show that anyone who emerges (discontinuously) to claim to 
be some one person, even if all alone, is not that some one person.^ 
In short, there are two requirements in Williams，idea of personal identity: 
(1) Whether a future person will be me must depend only on the intrinsic 
features of the relation between us. It cannot depend on what happens to 
other people. 
(2) Since personal identity has great significance, whether identity holds cannot 
depend on a trivial fact? 
Parfifs non-branching psychological criterion meets neither requirement. First, in a 
later version of the Teletransportation Story, Parfit asks us to imagine that besides 
Mars, my blueprint is also transmitted to a satellite of Jupiter called lo. If the 
blueprint on lo is ignored, then my Replica on Mars will be me. But if the scientists 
on lo make a Replica out of my blueprint, and when that wakes up, I shall cease to 
exist. According to Williams' first requirement, if I do wake up on Mars，whether I 
continue to exist does not depend on what happens to another person millions of 
miles away. So Parfifs claim violates Requirement (1). Second, Parfit has argued 
that the most important fact concerning my survival is that I shall be R-related to at 
least one future person. But whether the R-relation takes a branching form can be a 
trivial matter, i.e., whether the blueprint on lo will be ignored may be itself a trivial 
fact. So, on the non-branching version of the psychological criterion, my identity 
can depend on trivial facts. And this violates Requirement (2). 
To this charge Parfit replies that no plausible criterion of identity (including 
Williams' physical criterion) can satisfy the strong, modal version of the 
requirement of intrinsicness 一 that whether x continues to exist can only be 
determined intrinsically, not dependent on what happens to individuals who exert 
”bid p.32. 
7 These two requirements are found in Williams' 'Personal Identity and Individuation', in Problem 
of the Self, p.20. 
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no causal influence on x , Parfit uses the following example to illustrate how 
Williams' criterion fails to meet the first requirement Suppose I have two fatally 
brain-damaged brothers. Jack and Bill, and they are going to undergo an operation, 
each with half of my brain transplanted. Jack's operation is done successfully. 
However, before the other half is transplanted into Bill, it is dropped onto the floor. 
If this operation were also done successfully, I，according to the Non-Branching 
Memory Theory, would wake up in neither body. But in the present situation, I shall 
wake up in Jack's body. Yet whether I am the person in Jack's body cannot depend 
on what happens to the body of someone else. Thus Williams' physical criterion 
violates Requirement (1)，too. Moreover, compared with the importance of the feet 
that half of my brain will survive in Jack's body, what happens to the other half is 
relatively trivial. So Williams' criterion also violates Requirement (2). Parfit's 
discussion in his book also covers several other possible versions of the physical 
criterion with similar conclusions. Parfit concludes: 
In all of its possible versions, the Physical Criterion faces strong objections. 
And there are similar objections to the Psychological Criterion. Williams' 
requirements are both plausible. We have found that no plausible criterion 
of identity can meet both requirements. (If we were separately existing 
entities, like Cartesian Egos, our criterion might meet these requirements; 
but we have sufficient reasons to reject this view,)^ 
Parfit's view is rather that it is possible for identity to depend on an external 
fact and a trivial fact. He suggests the following analogous requirements, which are 
met by his Reductionist view: 
(a) that the answer [to the question of whether I stand to the future 
person in the relation that matters] must depend only on the intrinsic 
features of my relation to the future person, and that 
(b) this relation [that matters in personal identity] cannot fail to hold 
because of a trivial difference in the facts/® 
8 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp.267-270. 
“ 树 P.270. 
^^Ibid, P.271. See also Shoemaker, ‘Parfit on Identity', in Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, p.l38. 
If identity itself were what matters, then these analogues would be equivalent to 
Williams' requirements. However, Parfit states that identity matters only at a 
linguistic or conceptual level. At the level of what happens, it does not. So identity 
depending on extrinsicness is not absurd. Yet if we can prove that identity is not 
merely a linguistic matter, then Parfit，s attempts to undercut Williams' objection 
will fail. I shall come back to this in the next part. 
2.2 The Best Candidate Theory. 
Parfit's Non-Branching Memory Theory can also be revised into a kind of 
Best Candidate Theory. But the Best Candidate Theoiy is arguably subject to 
Williams' argument from the Principle of Intrinsicness. In this section, I shall 
further discuss the Best Candidate Theory and see how it fares in the face of 
Williams' kind of objection. 
Let me begin with the famous example for identity questions - the Ship of 
Theseus. The planks of the Ship of Theseus are replaced by new planks one by one 
over intervals of time. The planks removed are then destroyed. Since the removal 
takes place gradually, we do not regard the ship at each time a different one from 
the one before. Rather, we simply think at each time that she is the same ship with 
only one plank different We would believe her to be the same ship after many 
years of piecemeal repairs to the extent that she becomes entirely composed of new 
bits of wood. This parallels to people's belief that a person continues to exist in an 
operation where his cells are changed in a very slow speed, say, it takes ten years 
While some people accept that as we replace the planks of a ship the same ship continues to exist, 
others might query this view. Those who hold opposing view might suggest that the problem is 
similar to that of the heap: One grain of sand does not make a heap, neither do two or three, and that 
one grain of sand does not make the difference as to whether there is a heap. However, if we keep on 
adding sand, we know that sooner or later, there will be a heap. As we have seen» the problem of the 
ship has a similar structure and thus the same reasoning applies to it. Changing one plank does not 
alter the identity of the ship，nor do two or three, and that one plank does not m^e any difference as 
to the identity of the ship. But sooner or later, with the plants replaced to a certain extent, passengers 
who come on board the next time would not be able to recognize the ship anymore. If we assume 
that the problem of the ship is different from the problem of the heap in this respect, we would be 
begging the question because the burden is on us to establish that they are different. I shall respond 
to this objection and explain my view in the conclusion. Here let us go on with the 'commonsense' 
view that the identity of the ship will not change so as to continue our discussion on the Best 
Candidate Theory, 
for the whole course to be c o m p l e t e d ? Now suppose instead the planks removed 
were not destroyed but were stored carefully. They are then used to rebuild a ship. 
So now with the two ships floating in the sea side by side, we need to reconsider 
which one should be called ‘the Ship of Theseus'. Suppose the story goes on with 
the continuously repaired ship destroyed, leaving the plank-hoarder's ship alone. 
There are then three situations to be considered: 
Diasram 5 
Situation 1: Situation 2: Situation 3: 
b � 丫 广 
a is the original ship of Theseus; b or b � i s the continuously repaired ship; and c or 
c � i s the plank-hoarder's ship. With the help of the Best Candidate Theory, we can 
sort out the structure of the issue. In Situations 1 and 3，where only b and c�a re to 
be considered the candidates, it is natural to think that the best candidate is the 
continuously repaired ship and the plank-hoarder's one respectively. Yet we have to 
think carefully about which one of the two ships in Situation 2 is the Ship of 
Theseus. We would very likely vote for the continuously repaired ship if we are 
pressed for a decision, as we think spatio-temporal continuity is more important 
than the identity of the original parts. The plank-hoarder's ship is the best candidate 
as the ship of Theseus only if the other ship does not exist. In this way, the identity 
of the ship is extrinsically determined based on the Best Candidate Theory. This, 
however, is not the only way the Best Candidate Theory can look at the matter. Let 
us now turn to the views of different versions of the theoiy^l 
This point is mentioned in Part 3.1 of last chapter. 
131 am going to discuss Nozick's, Brian Garrett's and Noonan's views in the following. For more 
discussion on the Best Candidate Theory, see also Shoemaker's 'Persons and Their Pasts', in 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.7, 1970，pp.269-25 and Perry, 'Can the Self Divide?' in 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol.73,1972, pp.463-388. 
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• Nozick's Closest Continuer Theory 
According to Nozick's theory, something at t2 is not the same entity as X at 
tl if it is not X's closest continuer. To be the closest continuer means that it is 
closer to the person in question than all others. And if two things at t2 tie in 
closeness to X at tl, then neither is the same entity as X. At first sight, this theory 
looks similar to Williams' Reduplication Argument. However, Nozick aims rather 
at defending a theory that rejects Williams' Principle of Intrinsicness. He tries to 
undermine Williams' principle by using the case of the Ship of Theseus as a 
counterexample. When we hear the first part of the story, Nozick says，we are not 
puzzled or led to deny the continuously repaired ship as the Ship of Theseus. But 
when we learn of the existence of another candidate for the closest continuer, we 
come to doubt whether the continuously repaired ship is the original ship. This 
shows that we are inclined to think in a 'best-candidate' mode. Perhaps people may 
argue that the identity of a ship is different from that of a person. We are unwilling 
to think whether something is us can be a matter of decision or stipulation. However, 
Nozick replies that the nature and contours of people's responses to the puzzle of 
the ship fit the closest continuer schema for personal identity and support it. If such 
schema is not a metaphysical truth, it is at least a component of our psychological 
explanation of these r e s p o n s e s ” 
So while Williams' Principle of Intrinsicness reveals what we believe 
concerning our identity, the Closest Continuer Theory may claim that it appeals to 
our psychology. The Closest Continuer Theoiy may fiuther argue that the 
importance of intrinsicness cannot override the closest continuer schema, unless 
there is a separate argument against the theory. 
I think there is, indeed, a separate problem with the Best Candidate Theory. 
According to the theory, 
(a) Situation 1: a = b; 
(b) Situation 2: a = b�and a 关 c; and 
”Nozick, Philosophical Explcmations, p.34. 
(c) situations：a = c\ 
By the law of transitivity, if c a and a = c , then Thus, (b) and (c) entails 
that c is not the same ship as c\ This is a point that many of us would find 
unacceptable because c and c�are both quantitatively and qualitatively identical. So 
c and c � a r e the same ship, and it is contradictory to deny their identity. The only 
difference between them is that they happen to be found in two different possible 
worlds. With this problem presented, we may now turn to Garrett's and Noonan's 
versions of the Best Candidate Theory. 
• Garrett's Best Candidate Theory 
Some philosophers, such as Williams, regard the Best Candidate Theoiy as 
absurd because it rejects the Principle of Intrinsicness and may lead to the 
conclusion that c c � a s hown above. Brian Garrett, however, thinks that the 
commitment to the extrinsicness of identity can be accepted without absurdity. This 
is because the violation of intrinsicness does not entail the violation of the necessity 
of identity sentences or the semantic thesis. The semantic thesis states that identity 
sentences contain only rigid terms and are, if true, necessarily true and, if false， 
necessarily f a l s e . That means, though according to the Best Candidate Theory, 
is the Ship of Theseus in Situation 3 while c is not in Situation 2, c and c�can still 
indicate the same ship, thus the identity sentence c = is not violated. In other 
words, the absurdity of c c � i s avoided. (Parfit's view is similar as he also tries to 
solve the above problem by distinguishing the factual level from the linguistic level 
Yet his view is not wholly the same as Garrett's. Parfit thinks that the Best 
I 
Candidate Theoiy does not deny that whether X stands to some future person in the 
relation that matters can depend only on intrinsic features of X，s relation to that 
future person. Such defense shows that, in Parfit's mind, our inclination to the 
Principle of Intrinsicness arises from the belief that identity is what matters. But 
Garrett disagrees on this explanation of the inclination. I shall take up the 
discussion on the factual-linguistic distinction of personal identity and whether 
identity matters again in the next part.) 
15 Brian Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, London and New York: Routledge, 1998 
P.68. 
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According to Garrett, one's identity in reality indeed depends on external 
facts. For instance, the property of being some one person may not be a causal 
property of the body in which that person inheres. If a property does not contribute 
to the causal powers of a person, say, B，then it is lypical that its possession by B 
may depend on what happens to other objects, which exercise no causal influence 
on him. (Consider the property of being a war widow: it is not a causal property, as 
whether a woman is a war widow typically depends on what happens to someone 
who，at relevant time, exercises no causal influence on her/^) Garrett suggests that 
perhaps we should describe the Best Candidate Theoiy, not as committed to the 
extrinsicness of identity, but as committed to the extrimicness of existence-
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dependence. In other words, identity is，nevertheless, related to one's own 
existence to a certain extent. Therefore, Garrett contends that to determine a 
person's identity extrinsically is not a consequence that we ought to find counter-
intuitive. On the contrary, there are independent grounds for believing that being 
some one person should be counted an extrinsic property. Such extrinsic property is 
precisely what would be expected, given the non-causal character of such a property. 
Thus, the charge that commitment to the extrinsicness of identity reduces the Best 
Candidate Theories to absurdity has simply not been made out. 
• Noonan 's Closest Continuer Theory 
Noonan takes a similar stand as Garrett's to defend the best candidate view. 
He admits that rejecting the Only x and y Principle commits one to the claim that c 
丰 c� . So, Noonan accepts the Principle and claims that his theory is an alternative 
compatible with it. Noonan explains that in Situation 2, both b � a n d c have come 
into existence ever since the ship of Theseus was built They share the same origin 
and an initial part of their history. Similarly, concerning personal identity, in a case 
where there is fission, the distinct post-division persons, say, a and b, occupy the 
single pre-division body and are 'person-stages' of the same history with the one, 
say, c, before divisioa Instead of 'identity', Noonan calls the relation among a, b 
and c 'unity relation', which is a kind of equivalence relation without limiting the 
16 顺 p.69. 
n Ibid, P.70. 
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quantity of the person(s) concerned to one] 8 Noonan believes that both of the post-
division persons exist prior to division, and only become spatially distinct after 
division. There are totally three people occupying one single pre-division body.'^ 
If we accept the Only x and y Principle, it may be objected that, since b = b� 
and c = c � a n d since b � i s distinct from c, it cannot be true that both a = b in 
Situation 1 and a = c � i n Situation 3, as those Best Candidate theorists claim. For 
example, when someone in Situation 1 contemplates Situation 3，he cannot regard 
the ship in Situation 3 as 'the ship of Theseus' because for him, ‘the ship of 
Theseus' is b but b does not exist in Situation 3. Noonan replies that the problem 
arises only from our mislabeling of the ship. One has to say that ‘the ship of 
Theseus' designates b in Situation 1 and is used to designates c，in Situation 3. And 
which ship it designates in Situation 2 depends on which of b � a n d c has the best 
claim or the strongest candidature to the name. Therefore, to adhere to the Only x 
and y Principle, one cannot regard 'the ship of Theseus' as a rigid designator, 
(though it does not mean it can point to whatever reference.) In this way, it is 
possible to say that when the continuously repaired ship exists it is the Ship of 
Theseus, but when she does not the plank-hoarder's ship is, with such analysis 
fulfilling the requirement of the Only x and y Principle. Analogously, in fission 
situation of a person, the reference T is indeterminate between the two people 
involved, as the term is not a rigid designator. And the Only x and y Principle is not 
violated whether the name T refers to future person 1 or future person 2. 
From the arguments by Garrett and Noonan, we can see that the Best 
Candidate Theory and the Principle of Intrinsicness seem compatible if we treat 
identity as essentially a linguistic or semantic issue. Parfit has a similar view as 
Garrett's and Noonan's and thereby claims that identity per se does not concern 
what happens and thus does not matter. Moreover, if it is true that personal identity 
does not matter, the dependence of personal identity on external facts will not sound 
as absurd as we may think. So the Best Candidate Theory is justified if identity is 
only a relative equivalence relation and if the Principle of Unimportance of 
Noonan, Objects and Identity, The Hague and Boston: M. NijhofF, 1980, Chapter 13, 'Can One 
Thing Become Two?' p. 132. 
Yet such view is criticized by Garrett as involving a distortion of our concept of person. See 
Garrett, 'Personal Identity and Extrinsicness', in Philosophical Studies Vol 59, No. 2, 1990’ p. 181. 
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Personal Identity is correct But according to Williams, the application of a name to 
a certain person should not be floating because only an absolute equivalence 
relation can serve as the criterion of personal identity. And most importantly, 
Williams, as well as many other philosophers, simply do not think that personal 
identity per se is unimportant as Parfit contends. If Williams is right in this aspect, 
then the best candidate objection against Williams' theoiy of personal identity will 
be deprived of much of its force. Therefore, we need to revisit the issue about the 
importance of personal identity. 
3. The Importance (or Unimportance) of Personal Identity 
3.1 Unimportance: 'Personal Identity* as a Linguistic Issue? 
Parfit insists that personal identity is ‘grammatical，or ‘conceptual，. The 
answers to questions like ‘Which one is identical to Fawkes - Charles or Robert?' 
are merely different descriptions at the linguistic level. In fact, the question would 
better be rephrased as ‘Shall we call Charles ‘Fawkes’，or shall we call Robert 
‘Fawkes，?，Once we know the fects about the physical and/or psychological 
continuity, it is a purely 'verbal' or 'conceptual' decision whether or not we choose 
to call someone and Fawkes the same person. It is just like the cases that whether 
we decide to call sea-sickness ‘pain，or whether we decide to call a pile of sand a 
‘heap，.20 Since 'identity' is a one-to-one relation but both Charles and Robert are, in 
reality, psychologically continuous and connected to Fawkes, Parfit concludes that 
'identity' is found only in language but not in reality. 
Can we accept such a reductionist, Humean claim about the reality of 
personal identity? T. L. S. Sprigge points out that Parfit is denying that there is a 
hard and fast identity to person over time. And since the identity of some physical 
objects, such as, a paper weight, over time appears to be just exactly what people 
have in mind when they think of a hard and fast identity, what people take Parfit to 
be saying is that there is a less definite identity to people across time than there is to 
See Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, p.39. 
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such physical objects. However, personal identity is as good and basic an identity 
as there can be. In Sprigge's words, it is one of the 'non pareiV cases of identity. 
Sprigge explains that ordinarily we believe that each of us is as definite and 'full' as 
can be. That is, we believe in the very full empirical identity of personal essences 
across time, even in cases where identity becomes problematic. Identity is not some 
thin abstraction. Rather, it is substantial as a distinctive style of experiencing the 
generally same world handed on from moment to moment in the stream of 
consciousness. He thus criticizes: 
Parfit and the Buddhists are wrong to suggest that it [personal identity] is 
not a really genuine identity. It is at least as absolute as best case physical 
identity. And since (as I think) it is the identity of something more fijlly 
individual than any physical thing it may properly be regarded as a more 
important identity? 
For Parfit, our linguistic concepts do not always fit our actual situation 
because language and reality are, indeed, of two separate levels. However, this is 
not always how Parfit appears to see the matters. At first it seems he is trying to 
develop his theory of personal identity on the metaphysical or even empirical, rather 
than purely conceptual, level. Sometimes he writes as if the falsity of Non-
Reductionism is empirical rather than a priori because he says there is no empirical 
evidence of the existence of the ‘separately existing entity'. As Shoemaker points 
out, personal identity, according to Parfit, 'necessarily' involves certain things, and 
the notion here is nomological or metaphysical necessity rather than conceptual or 
logical necessity. Parfit does discuss cases like division by hemisphere 
transplantation, which appears to be a nomological and metaphysical possibility for 
human beings. However, he also relies on many other imagined cases, but 
imaginability in this sense pertains more to conceptual possibility and necessity 
than to nomological or metaphysical possibility and necessity. ^ ^ Hence, Parfit is 
inconsistent to show which level of the identity problem that he is trying to tackle. 
21 T. L. S. Sprigge, ‘Personal and Impersonal Identity', mMind, Vol.97,1988, p.31. 
22 概 P.48. 
^ Shoemaker, 'Parfit on Identity', 'm Reading Parfit, p. 140. 
That Parfit does seem to view the issue of identity as empirical means that 
his use of imaginary cases in his arguments may sometimes give rise to 
puzzlements. Consider for example in Parfit's story of the Japanese woman 24 The 
story is about a Japanese woman who remembers living the life of a Celtic warrior 
in the Bronze Age. Archaeological investigations have confirmed that the memories 
are veridical. Since the Japanese woman is not physically continuous with the Celtic 
warrior, Parfit concludes that there must be some purely mental entity which is 
involved in the life of the Japanese woman, and has continued to exist till her time 
since the time that the Celtic warrior lived. (Parfit thinks that the Cartesian ego is 
such an entity,) In making such a discovery Parfit is appealing to psychological 
C&C as the epistemological criterion of personal identity，since it is the memoiy 
connectedness between the Japanese woman and the Celtic warrior that allows us to 
identify them with each other. However, this story is a case where Non-
Reductionism is true, as it seems to prove the existence of some (purely mental 
entity'. If Non-Reductionism is true, then psychological C&C, as a Reductionist 
criterion of personal identity, must be false. One may thus criticize, as Shoemaker 
did, that Parfit's presentation of the story simply shows an irony of using 
psychological C&C as our criterion of personal identity，leading to the consequence 
that personal identity does not consist in psychological C&C. 
3.2 Importance: Subjective Linkage of the First Person 
According to Parfit, I should regard having a replica as good as ordinaiy 
survival, if I am rational, because my Replica is psychologically continuous with 
me and is thus the best candidate to be me after my death. The underlying principle 
for Parfifs claim is that ‘identity，is not what matters. However, using the case of 
the Ship of Theseus as an example, Garrett points out that the reason why we are 
inclined to believe that the identity of ships over time can be determined only 
intrinsically cannot be that we believe that identity is what matters (to us) in the 
continued existence of ships over time: 
Parfit's story ；s found in his Reasons and Persons, p.227. For Shoemaker's analysis, see 
Shoemaker, ‘ P ^ t on Identity', Ibid, p. 141. 
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Antiquarian interests aside, no one believes that identity is what matters in 
the survival of ships over time: if I were a ship owner, it would make no 
difference to me if my ship were destroyed and replaced with an exactly 
similar - but numerically distinct 一 replica. Any attitudes I may have to my 
original ship can simply be transferred to the replica, since there is perfect 
replication of function, structure and appearance. Hence, Parfit's 
explanation of the grounds for our belief that identity over time can be only 
intrinsically determined cannot, in general, be correct. ^ ^ 
What Garrett means is that while the identity of the ship does not matter to us, we 
still believe it must be intrinsically determined. Similarly, our inclination to believe 
in the Principle of Intrinsicness can be independent of the belief that personal 
identity is what matters. 
This is a very interesting objection. However, I think our inclination to the 
Principle of Intrinsicness is nevertheless related to our belief of the importance of 
personal identity. It should be wrong to compare, as Garrett does, the identity of the 
ship to that of a person regarding the importance involved. In fact，in the footnote of 
the above quotation, Garrett himself does say that our attitude to, e.g., works of art 
and wedding rings, may not be the same as that to the ship? If Garrett has made 
such a distinction between the identity of something like a ship and that of other 
kinds of things, such as works of art and wedding rings，he needs to further explain 
why personal identity must belong to the first group, not the second. 1 think the 
contrary is true. The importance of a ship, in Garrett's mind, is only functional. 
Thus, the ship owner may not feel too bad if the ship is replaced. Yet the reasons 
why a piece of art and a wedding ring are important are in most cases that they are 
the representation of, say, one's accomplishment and the evidence of love. Such 
representation contributes to the importance of the identity of the items. Personal 
identity, I believe, is more similar to the identity of such items than that of a ship, 
which is only functionally meaningful. (In fact, the ship owner may also have 
25 Garrett, 'Personal Identity and Extrinsicness，，'m Philosophical Studies Vol59, No. 2, p. 190. 
After saying 'If I were a ship owner, it would make no difference to me if ray ship were destroyed 
and replaced with an exactly similar - but numerically distinct 一 replica,' Garrett adds that 'The 
same may not be true of, e.g., works of art and wedding rings.' See Garrett, 'Personal Identity and 
Extrinsicness', Ibid, p. 194, n29. 
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emotion to his ship to the extent that for him, the ship cannot be replaced in 
whatever way. So the identity of that ship also belongs to the second group same as 
that of works of art and wedding rings.) It is because the meaning of a person's life 
is not determined by his instrumental value. Rather, it is closely related to his 
accomplishment and his relation with others. Hence, it is true both that personal 
identity cannot be determined by external facts and that it matters. 
Relating all these to the first-person point of view may help make my points 
clearer. To return to the Teletransportation Story, Parfit says that I should not be 
depressed about my imminent death since my Replica will take up eveiy part of my 
life and will do just as well as me: to finish writing my book, to love my husband 
and take care of my children. However, although she is psychologically continuous 
with me, I still find it difficult to regard that prospect as good as my ordinary 
survival It is because I do not simply want my book to be finished’ my husband to 
be loved and my children to be looked after, but rather to have all these done in the 
future only by me. In fact, I would not be willing to have someone else meddling in 
my work and sharing my success. I would be jealous about someone else kissing 
my husband and I would not want my children to call her ‘mom，. I cannot bear to 
have someone else taking my place in the heart of my beloved. This shows that 
psychological C&C are not enough for identity and that we must appeal to a more 
intimate relation between my earlier self and my later self Let me call this relation 
subjective linkage. Such linkage is related to my own life，thus my own identity. It 
is a relation much more important than psychological C&C to the first person. 
My identity is important because I want to experience all these (i.e., loving 
my spouse, writing my books and so on) myself. I am not only talking of the 
experience itself but also my participation in it with me as the subject of experience. 
Parfit claims that people are subjects only because of the way we talk. However, 
experience and its subject are interdependent. They are, indeed, the two sides of the 
same coin. One cannot acknowledge one and deny the other. As Shoemaker says， 
‘experiencings，are patently adjectival, in the way 'seeings' are adjectival on 'seers', 
Meeds' are adjectival on ‘doers，，etc. Mind the use of the word ‘event，by Parfit 
27 Shoemaker, ‘Parfit on Identity', in Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, p. 139. 
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when referring to the e x p e r i e n c e . As Shoemaker points out, Parfit prefers to use 
‘event, to the word ‘state，，because a state must be of some entities, while the same 
is not true of events. This makes it possible for Parfit to avoid talking of the 
subjective linkage and to focus on psychological C&C itself. But as shown above, it 
is not enough to talk merely of psychological C&C. To return to the 
Teletransportation Story, to be told that there will be someone else alive tomorrow 
when I am dead who will then be psychologically connected to me today would be 
at most a small consolation.^ ^ I would still believe that she is not me. I would be 
inclined to think that this fleshy object - my body — is not something I merely 
currently inhabit. I would also think that the body is me even if I die, when my 
psychological states leave my body. The dead body is me and I will be dead,�To 
this Parfit might respond that ail these feelings, inclinations or beliefs are false 
beliefs. However, such beliefs would not be false if the importance of subjective 
linkage of the first person to personal identity is justified. I think we cannot ignore 
such a linkage when thinking about personal identity. I shall come back to this point 
in the conclusion. 
While Parfit fails to acknowledge the importance of subjective linkage, it 
seems Williams, on the other hand, is sympathetic to the subject-of-experience view. 
This can be seen from his Nonduplication Argument about how frightened I am 
when I am told that I will be tortured in the future, as well as the discussion in 
'Persons, Character and Morality' where he writes: '...An individual person has a 
set of desires, concerns or, as I shall often call them, projects, which help to 
constitute a character,, ‘...Each person has a character.This talk of the relation 
between the identity of a person and his character, however, is in a way similar to 
the Non-Reductionist talk of the identity of the self, regarding the emphasis on 
one's subjective experience. Parfit states very clearly that Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism are two opposite views. So one may ask whether Williams' sympathy 
to the subject-of-experience can be squared with his Reductionist bodily theory. 
For example, when talking of the beliefs of Reductionists, one of the points that Parfit writes is: 'A 
person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of 
interrelated physical and mental events: See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.211. 
的 Thomson, 'People and their Bodies', in Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, p.219. 
3 � 侧 p.202，203. 
31 Williams, 'Persons, Character and Morality', in Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981，p.201. 
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Perhaps Reductionism and Non-Reductionism are indeed compatible and so 
we do not need to distinguish them in the way Parfit does. Parfit states that it is a 
false belief that our identity must be determinate and thus Non-Reductionism is 
false. But Garrett points out that Parfit's use of the term 'reductionist' to include the 
view that personal identity is not all-or-nothing is unhelpful. He explains: 
...One could be reductionist... and think that personal identity over time is a 
perfectly determinate matter. This would be so, for example, if the 
conditions of personal identity over time were the same as those for the 
identity of brains over time and if, for some bizarre reason, it turned out that 
brain-identity was necessarily determinate.^^ 
This example shows that a Reductionist need not reject the view that personal 
identity is determinate. It is logically possible to have cases in which the 
continuation of the existence of the brain is the criterion of personal identity, and 
that personal identity is determinate. In other words, there can be cases where 
Reductionist beliefs and Non-Reductionist beliefs are compatible. Or, perhaps we 
should admit that there are still some further facts underneath our physical and/or 
psychological continuity, which are crucial to our identity. For this reason I believe 
that Nagel is right to say that the idea of personal identity would be an illusion if 
there is not something in which the flow of consciousness and the beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and character traits that I have all take place - something beneath the 
contents of consciousness, but we are not in that illusive situation. ^ ^ 
4. Conclusion 
With all I have discussed so far, I hope I have shown how important the 
question of personal identity is to us, especially from the first personal perspective. 
We have also seen that Williams would be sympathetic to this view. As a 
32 Shoemaker's idea can be found in his 'Criticals Notice' {oiReasons and Persons by Derek Parfit), 
Mind, Vol44, 1985’ pp.449-450; reprinted in Noonan, (ed.), Personal Identity, pp.265-266. See 
Garrett, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, p.38. 
“Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986, Chapter 3，"Mind and Body", 
P.45. 
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concluding remark, I want to explain why, the Reduction-Non-Reduction dispute 
aside, it is not entirely unproblematic to say that psychological C&C is the criterion 
of personal identity and that personal identity can be described impersonally. 
We have seen how Parfit establishes his theory of personal identity, a theory 
which is totally different irom Williams'. Concerning the nature of personal identity, 
he shows that identity can be decided on external facts with the help of his non-
branching psychological C&C criterion and the Best Candidate Theory. Then he 
focuses on the importance of personal identity, indeed, its w/z-importance. In this 
way, he believes that he has dealt with the problem of fission in a reductionist 
manner while holding that psychological C&C is the criterion of personal identity. 
But his emphasis on the psychological C&C and the idea that personal identity can 
be described impersonally, I think, seem to lead to a dilemma. This can be 
explained as follows. 
From the first person point of view, it seems that the true explanation of my 
identity is found in Non-Reductionism. It is because from my ‘inner, view as a 
subject, it is impossible for me to imagine myself splitting into two people. 
Borderline cases are therefore not a possibility. Therefore，my identity must be 
determinate. On the other hand, it seems that Reductionism gives a better 
description of personal identity, if we look at the matter from a third person point of 
view. It is because from this perspective, man is just like physical objects in the 
sense that their identity may in some cases be indeterminate. With respect to most 
concepts denoting physical objects, there are virtually inexhaustible sources of 
vagueness. Such feature of concepts of physical objects has famously been called 
'open texture' or 'possibility of vagueness，.The case of ‘person’ is a case in point. 
So there can be borderline cases for people. Personal identity is indeterminate and 
fission of a person is, at least conceptually, possible. 
It seems quite reasonable for Parfit to take a third person point of view when 
discussing the issue of personal identity because it is very natural to talk about 
people around us in this way. However, if Parfit takes a third personal perspective 
树 See William P. Alson, Philosophy of Language, Prentice Hall, 1964. 
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and a Reductionist view, why does he favor a psychological explanation instead of 
a physical one? I think the reason is that Parfit has implicitly relied on a first-person 
perspective. The first-person perspective inclines us to focus on psychological or 
mental experiences. This intuition is shared by almost all theories, and Parfifs is no 
exception. This leads however to a dilemma. On the one hand, he insists that the 
only sensible way to talk of personal identity is from a third person point of view 
and with impersonal descriptions. On the other hand, he claims that psychological 
C&C is the criterion of personal identity. Yet this latter claim is most plausible as a 
claim based on first person intuitions and from the first person point of view, a view 
according to which the identity of a person cannot be indeterminate. 
Yet the Psychological Theory is, for sure, not luiproblematic. As Thomson 
points out, there is serious trouble for those who regard purely psychological 
connectedness as the mark of personal identity. First and foremost, they are 
committed to its being the case that tinkering with someone's brain，or feeding a 
person a drug, could result in a new person, and that is very implausible.^^ As we 
have seen, if Williams' arguments are sound, mental life cannot go on in a different 
brain. One's identity cannot be so easily explained by psychological C&C. Just as 
what Nagel says, the connection between the mental life and the body is very close 
and intimate. No mental event can occur without any physical changes in the body 一 
in vertebrates the brain 一 of its subject^^ (This may be a clue to the questions why 
people believe that the identity of the Ship of Theseus does not change though its 
planks keep changing, and that different speeds of changing a person's brain cells 
would lead to different conclusions of the identity of that person. In the case of the 
ship, we would adapt, at each interval, to the new plank and identify it as part of the 
ship after a certain time. In the case of the person, to replace the whole brain of A 
with B，s in a single move, we would be prompted to believe that, when A-body-
person wakes up afterwards, he would be B; but to change one brain cell of A with 
B，s each day, we would say that there are times for the development of the 
interrelationship between A's brain and every new coming brain cell from B's brain 
so that, with the eventual complicated mental events in A-body-person after the 
whole course of the operation, we could not simply identify A-body-person as B 
Thomson, 'People and their Bodies', 'm Reading Parfit, p.217. 
See Nagel, The View from Nowhere, pp.28-29. 
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though all the brain cells in the body then are B's brain cells. 1 wish to make myself 
clear that I am not putting forward auy concrete explanation to the relationship 
between the mental events and the physical body, but just to show that such 
relationship is very complicated.) We might fail to explain how the physical 
changes give rise to the mental events of a person, who has a mind, a point of view 
and subjective experiences. Nevertheless, like what Nagel thinks, I believe that we 
need to explore for better explanations rather than simply accepting purely 
psychological connectedness as the mark of personal identity. 
Worse still, those people in question are also committed to its being the case 
that a question about personal identity, or about determinacy in personal identity, or 
about how many people there are at a given time or place, can turn on a fact that 
should surely be irrelevant to it.^ ^ They think that one's own identity would depend 
on the existence or non-existence of someone else. Some support this view with the 
argument that our concepts of personal identity are merely linguistic and are thus 
unimportant to our existence in reality. Parfit even thinks that we can choose what 
type of beings to consider ourselves to be. For instance, he defines 'Phoenix Parfit' 
as the individual he is who would survive replication. This is interesting but Nagel 
has made a very important point that I think every theorist of personal identity 
should bear in mind: 
This is an ingenious suggestion, but there must be some objective limits to 
the freedom to reconstrue oneself, or it will become hollow. I can't defeat 
death by identifying myself as ‘Proteus Nagel', the being who survives if 
anyone survives, 'Phoenix Parfit' seems to me also an abuse, though clearly 
a lesser one, of the privilege of choosing one's own identity. 
Like any other philosophical questions, the problem of personal identity is 
not a question created out of nothing at all, but has its root in our concern for our 
life. Or else, it is, as Nagel says, hollow. 
“Thomson, 'People and their Bodies', in Reading Pcofit, p.217. 
Ibid, p.45. For Parfit's remarks, see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Section 98. 
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